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INTRODUCTION

Of the available renewable energy support mechanisms, feed-in tariffs
("FITs")-laws that mandate the purchase of renewable energy at premium
prices-often gamner praise as the best and most proven policy.' Feed-in tariffs,
it is said, offer an abundance of benefits. They are effective. They send clear
market signals. They reduce risk both for investors and for renewable energy
facility operators. Thus, because feed-in tariffs provide the kind of certainty
investors crave, many observers assert that they are more cost-effective than
other renewable support policies, as they moderate the need for risk premiums
and reduce renewables' costs through "learning by doing.",2 All this has caused
I This statement deserves some context. it refers primarily to advocates of renewable energy
as such. Those who promote renewables as a climate mitigation tool often see renewable energy
support mechanisms as necessarily "second best" policies, because direct mitigation tools lie
carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems may be more effective and efficient at reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. Others oppose policies like FITs and RPSs. For an example of a
critique of such laws, see Robert J. Michaels, A National Renewable Portfolio Standard:
PoliticallyCorrect, Economically Suspect, ELECTRICITY J., Apr. 2008, at 9.
2
Robert Wand & Florian Leuthold, Feed-in Tariffsfor Photovoltaics: Learning by Doing in
Germany?, 88 APPLIED ENERGY 4387 (2011). For discussions of the comparative efficacy and
efficiency of feed-in tariffs and RPSs, see, for example, INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, DEPLOYING
RENEWABLES:
PRINCIPLES FOR EFFEcTwvE POLICIES 101-24 (2008),
available at
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2008/deployingrenewables2OO8.pdf-,
see also INT'L
ENERGY AGENCY, DEPLOYING RENEWABLES: BEST AND FuTuRE POLICY PRACTICE (2011).
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many advocates of renewable energy to heap acclaim on feed-in tariffs, with
one observer declaring them simply "fabulous."
The rosy picture often painted of feed-in tariffs is important. In what is
frequently characterized as a dichotomous choice between the two leading
renewable energy support mechanisms-feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio
standards ("RPSs")-many observers have cast their lot with the feed-in tariff.
Irrespective of RPS performance,4 the line of scholars, analysts, and advocates
rushing to say that feed-in tariffs are better is not a short one. Numerous studies
have suggested that in a head-to-head match, feed-in tariffs repeatedly
outperform RPSs on both efficacy and efficiency. 5 Thus, one set of
commentators recently observed that there is an emerging trend in the literature
showing that feed-in tariffs are the superior renewable energy support policy. 6
Of course, the choice between feed-in tariffs and RPSs is hardly
mutually exclusive. The devices might be used in tandem, or they might serve
as complementary evolutionary steps in a jurisdiction's support for renewable
energy.7 But the fact that feed-in tariffs are earning so much adulation cannot
be discounted. Over-exaltation risks marginalizing other renewable support
policies.

David Jacobs, Fabulous Feed-in Tariffs, 11 RENEWABLE ENERGY Focus 28 (2010).
4
There is some disagreement about how effective RPSs are. For a summary of the literature,
see Lincoln L. Davies, Reconciling Renewable Portfolio Standards and Feed-in Tariffs, 32
UTAH. ENVTL. L. REv. 311, 333-37 (2012).
s
See, e.g., Lucy Butler & Karsten Neuhoff, Comparison of Feed-in Tariff Quota and
Auction Mechanisms to Support Wind Power Development, 33 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1854, 1858

(2008); C.G. Dong, Feed-in Tarif vs. Renewable Portfolio Standard:An Empirical Test of Their
Relative Effectiveness in Promoting Wind Capacity Development, 42 ENERGY POL'Y 476 (2012);
Reinhard Haas et al., A HistoricalReview of PromotionStrategiesfor Electricityfrom Renewable
Energy Sources in EU Countries, 15 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REvs. 1003, 1026

(2011); Marc Ringel, Fostering the Use of Renewable Energies in the European Union: The
Race Between Feed-in Tariffs and Green Certificates, 31 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1 (2006). For a
discussion of the literature, see Davies, supra note 4, at 333-42. For an excellent assessment of
why this may be so, see Felix Mormann, Enhancing the Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy,
42 ENVTL. L. 681, 704-24 (2012).
6
See Pablo del Rio & Pere Mir-Artigues, Supportfor Solar PV Deployment in Spain: Some
Policy Lessons, 16 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REvs. 5557, 5558 (2012). For analyses

of the barriers renewable energy deployment faces, see Felix Mormann, Requirements for a
Renewables Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 903 (2011). See also Uma Outka, EnvironmentalLaw
and FossilFuels: Barriersto Renewable Energy, 65 VAND. L. REv. 1679 (2012).
7

LAB.,

See Davies, supra note 4; see also KARLYNN CORY ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY
FEED-IN TARIFF POLICY: DESIGN,

IMPLEMENTATION,

AND POLICY INTERACTIONS

9-11

(2009), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09ostil45549.pdf; Volkmar Lauber, REFIT and
RPS: Options for a HarmonisedCommunity Framework, 32 ENERGY POL'Y 1405, 1405 (2004);
Wilson H. Rickerson et al., If the Shoe FITs: Using Feed-in Tariffs To Meet US. Renewable
Electricity Targets, 20 ELEC. J. 73, 83-84 (May 2007).
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There can be no question that feed-in tariffs often have been extremely
effective. The two global leaders in solar photovoltaic installations-Spain and
Germany-have used feed-in tariffs, and those same two countries are within
the top four nations for installed wind power capacity worldwide.8 Germany,
for one, has revolutionized its electricity system under its feed-in tariff,
increasing its use of renewable electricity sevenfold over the last twenty-five
years and rapidly approaching its goal of 35% electricity production from
renewables by 2020. This is an astonishing feat for a developed, heavily
industrialized nation, and it is turning heads across the globe. By one count, as
of 2012, at least 61 countries and 26 states or provinces had some form of feedin tariff in place.9
Yet the stock story of feed-in tariffs as policy overachievers is
beginning to show cracks. Increasingly, the media has spotlighted stark
economic and political troubles that feed-in tariffs have caused or encountered,
such as in Spain.' 0 Moreover, focusing solely on feed-in tariff success ignores
key subplots of these laws' effects.
As much as feed-in tariffs have created a blue sky for renewables, they
also have put clouds on the horizon. In many portraits of FIT function, this goes
overlooked. Feed-in tariffs bring benefits, but they also have downsides.
Among these, feed-in tariffs can be expensive, a fact that can be exacerbated if,
as in some regimes, FIT funds are drawn from state coffers. Feed-in tariffs can
lag behind the technology change they create, thus generating windfall profits
and over-subsidizing the renewable industry. Feed-in tariffs can cause energy
inequity, benefiting well-off citizens who can afford to install solar panels at
the expense of lower-income consumers who have to pay higher electricity
bills.
Feed-in tariffs also can create enormous turmoil for the existing energy
system. As renewable energy penetration goes up, the grid, which was not built
to handle energy swings or two-way transactions with end consumers, becomes
more difficult to manage. Grid operators thus have to adapt to changing energy
profiles that are less predictable and less controllable than before because
renewables are both more intermittent and less dispatchable than conventional
generation. Feed-in tariffs likewise hold the potential to significantly disrupt
the predecessor energy markets into which they are introduced. Renewables
require easily dispatchable generation to back them up, plus other resources
such as voltage support, yet feed-in tariffs do not always anticipate this-nor
See GLOBAL WIND ENERGY CouNciL, GLOBAL WIND STATISTIcs 2013 (May 2, 2014),
availableat http://www.gwec.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/GWEC-PRstats-2013_EN.pdf.
Del Rio & Mir-Artigues, supra note 6, at 5558.
8

1o See, e.g., Andrds Cala, Renewable Energy in Spain is Taking a Beating, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct.
8,
2013),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/09/business/energyenvironment/renewable-energy-in-spain-is-taking-a-beating.html?pagewanted=1&_r-0.
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do they necessarily ensure the market will adequately adapt to the changing
load profile which FITs create." The result: as feed-in tariffs become
increasingly effective at achieving their goal, the physical, legal, and economic
worlds in which they operate begin to experience, at best, growing pains, and
increasingly more often, tumult.
As this occurs, turmoil surrounds feed-in tariffs. The laws themselves
become subject to frequent tinkering, modification, and amendment. The
ensuing state is a paradoxical one. While feed-in tariffs often are praised for
creating certainty, they themselves become uncertain. As a consequence, the
very reason why renewable energy advocates favor FITs can become quickly
lost. Feed-in tariffs in full throttle can morph seamlessly into feed-in tariffs in
turmoil.
Perhaps it should not be surprising that feed-in tariffs incite great
change around them. After all, the very idea of the feed-in tariff is that it will
disrupt the persistent energy paradigm: make it greener, more competitive, and
more democratic by swapping out old energy sources and players for smaller,
more distributed generation run by more diverse, more nimble competitors with
new and different business models. Indeed, the fact that feed-in tariffs force
their own evolution might be seen more as policy success than failure: That a
FIT needs to adjust to a changing market means that the policy is doing what it
is supposed to. Nevertheless, the darker side of feed-in tariffs-and how to
grapple with the challenges they create-has received remarkably little
attention to date in the scholarly debate over renewable energy policy.
This Article seeks to throw light on this aspect of the feed-in tariff
story. By examining head-on the dilemmas that feed-in tariffs present in some
of the most high profile countries where they have been deployed, we hope to
show that the oft-offered, optimistic narrative of feed-in tariffs is in actuality
much more complex, complicated, and uncertain. Our core point is that feed-in
tariffs, as effective as they might be, create challenges too-challenges that, if
not managed well by governments willing to adapt their policy regimes to
changing circumstances, can become significant problems. As feed-in tariffs
evolve, they demand increasing amounts of management and attention, and that
effort cannot be achieved solely by fine-tuning FIT design itself. Feed-in tariffs
inexorably impact the complex (physical, legal, political, social, and economic)
energy systems in which they operate. Accordingly, responsive change
exogenous to these policies is inevitable, and FIT policy evolution in turn must
account for it. In drawing attention to this more complete narrative of feed-in
tariffs, we thus offer some initial observations of the challenges feed-in tariffs

"
Concededly, any effective renewable support policy might impose any of these effects.
That FITs are now the focus of this discussion is in part because they have been so broadly
adopted and in part because they have, in many cases, produced rapid results.
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face. Our hope is that by adding this texture, the more nuanced narrative of
feed-in tariff performance and design will emerge.
Specifically, four major lessons arise from our analysis of feed-in
tariffs in Germany, Spain, and South Korea. First, feed-in tariffs are undeniably
effective at deploying renewable technology. Second, during a feed-in tariff's
lifetime, problems, particularly related to costs, make modification of the FIT
policy design inevitable. Third, the change that feed-in tariffs effect goes
beyond the FIT itself and impacts external energy and other related systems.
Finally, rapid or unexpected changes brought about by feed-in tariffs can
undermine the certainty and stability that makes these policies attractive in the
first place. Avoiding modifications that weaken confidence in the FIT's
renewable energy support regime should be foremost in the minds of
policymakers as they adapt their laws to new challenges.
This Article proceeds in six parts. Parts II, III, and IV offer case studies
of notable nations that have used feed-in tariffs: Germany, Spain, and South
Korea. Each case study traces the evolution of the country's law, its record of
success and overall impact, and the challenges it now faces. Part V draws
observations and sketches out initial impressions about the difficulties feed-in
tariffs create and the obstacles they confront. Part VI concludes.
II. GERMANY
If feed-in tariffs are the model policy for promoting renewables,
Germany may offer the classic tale. For years, Germany has been lauded as a
global renewable energy exemplar. Its feed-in tariff has not just worked but
worked well-not only getting renewables built but ensuring multiple types of
technologies are deployed. In wind, in solar, in renewables in general, 12
Germany has quickly emerged as a world leader, in no small part because of its
feed-in tariff.
Like any good story worth telling, however, Germany's is not a simple
straight line. Its plot is full of twists and turns, with the German feed-in tariff
transforming in multiple ways over the last two-and-a-half decades. Morphing
from a modest 1990 law that gave feed-in tariffs their name, to the current
sophisticated regime that now occupies 81 pages of law, 13 the German feed-in

12
Also of particular note in Germany are biogas and biomass combined heat and power
("CHP") systems, which grew rapidly under the country's FIT regime.
13

See Gesetzflir den Vorrang ErneuerbarerEnergien, ERNEUERBARE-ENERGIEN.DE (Jan. 1,

2012),
available
at
http://www.emeuerbare-energien.de/fileadmin/eeimport/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/eeg_2012_bfpdf. Legal commentaries on the
Emeuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, or "EEG," further underscore the law's complexity. See generally,
e.g., MARTIN ALTROCK ET AL., EEG: ERNEUERBARE-ENERGIEN-GESETZ

KOMMENTAR (3d ed.

2011) (1197 pages); WALTER FRENZ ET AL., EEG: ERNEUERBARE-ENERGIEN-GESETZ KOMMENTAR
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tariff today is as complicated as it is controversial. Indeed, in the current
context, questions epitomize the German law as much as accounts of its success
do. While the longevity of the German FIT may not yet be in serious doubt,
only one thing about the future of the law's shape and design seems clear: They
are uncertain.
A.

The German FIT: A Leader, a Challenger
1.

Germany's FIT Innovation: The StrEG of 1990

The first feed-in tariff in the world--or, at least, the law that gave feedin tariffs their name-was German. 14 In 1990, Germany adopted its
Stromeinspeisegesetz ("StrEG"), which roughly translates as "electricity feed-in
law," and the feed-in tariff was born.15 As the progenitor of FITs around the
globe, the 1990 StrEG bore the hallmarks of what we now know as the
archetypal feed-in tariff. 16 It mandated that network operators purchase
electricity produced by renewables, so long as a large utility was not the energy
producer. And it established incentive prices that had to be paid for those
purchases. 17
Both of these policy innovations were critical. The mandatory purchase
requirement substantially simplified the process for German renewable
generators to bring their product to market. "Generators were not required to
negotiate contracts or otherwise engage in much bureaucratic activity."' 8
Instead, the StrEG itself imposed the mandate to connect and purchase
electricity. Thus, the StrEG removed an important barrier to entry because,

(3d ed. 2013) (1804 pages); PETER SALJE, EEG 2012: ERNEUERBARE-ENERGIEN-GESETZ
KOMMENTAR (6th ed. 2011) (1590 pages).
14
Of course, the idea of the StrEG was preceded by PURPA in the United States, which
arguably was the original feed-in tariff or, at least, the progenitor of modern FITs. See Lincoln L.
Davies, Incentivizing Renewable Energy Deployment: Renewable Portfolio Standards and Feedin-Tariffs, 1 KLRI J.L. & LEGIS. 39, 52 (2011).
15
See RANIER HINRICHS-RAHLWES, SUSTAINABLE ENERGY POLICIES FOR EUROPE: TOwARDS
100% RENEWABLE ENERGY 30 n.12 (2013).
16
The StrEG was adopted in 1990 but took effect in 1991. The literature thus refers to it
alternately as the 1990 StrEG or the 1991 StrEG.
17
See Paul-Georg Gutermuth, Regulatory andInstitutionalMeasures by the State to Enhance
the Deployment of Renewable Energies: German Experiences, 69 SOLAR ENERGY 205, 207
(2000).
18
Volkmar Lauber & Lutz Mez, Three Decades of Renewable Electricity Policies in
Germany, 15 ENERGY & ENV'T, no. 4, 2004, at 3, available at http://www.windworks.org/cms/uploads/media/Three decadesofrenewable electricitypolicy inGernany.pdf.
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previously, monopoly utilities had resisted efforts by non-affiliates to
interconnect with the network.' 9
Likewise, the StrEG gave companies strong incentives to produce
electricity using renewables. It established payment rates that were, by
historical measures, quite generous. 20 These rates changed yearly and were
calculated based on "the average revenues earned by the network operators
from sales to all final electricity consumers" during the prior year-that is,
retail electricity prices. 2 1 The rates were also technology-specific. For solar and
wind, the rate was 90% of average final sale revenues. From 1991 to 1999, this
rate fluctuated between 8.45 and 8.84 Ecents/kWh.2 2 For electricity produced
by hydropower, biomass, and landfill or sewage gas, the rate varied between
65, 75, and 80% of the final sale revenues, depending on the size and type of
the facility and the year in question.2 3
The StrEG thus broke new ground in two important ways. It made
Germany both a leader on renewable energy policy and a challenger. Germany
became a leader because its feed-in tariff opened up markets for renewables in
a way prior policies had not. The StrEG's purchase and price guarantees gave
investors a kind of stability and predictability they had not enjoyed under
former regimes, such as the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act ("PURPA")
in the United States, 24 or Germany's own PURPA-like avoided cost regime. 25
This made renewable energy projects in Germany more attractive financially
and set off an "unexpected boom" in wind energy.26 In turn, Germany came to

See Gutermuth, supra note 17, at 207.
DAVID JACOBS, RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY CONVERGENCE IN THE EU: THE EVOLUTION OF
FEED-IN TARIFFS INGERMANY, SPAIN AND FRANCE 176-77 (2012).
21
Gutermuth, supra note 17, at 207.
22
JACOBS, supra note 20, at 176. The rate at the time was expressed in pfennigs rather than
Eurocents. The rate in 1991 was roughly 16.61 pfennigs per kilowatt hour ("pf/kWh") and 16.52
pf/kWh in 1999. See Lauber & Mez, supra note 18, at 4. From 1948 until the adoption of the
Euro in 1999, the Deutsche Mark was Germany's official currency and was subdivided into
Mark,
OANDA
CORP.,
per
Mark.
German
pfennigs-100
pfennigs
http://www.oanda.com/currency/iso-currency-codes/DEM (last visited Feb. 26, 2014). In 1999,
one Mark was worth just over E0.50 Euros and approximately $0.60 U.S. Currency Converter,
OANDA CORP., http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
23
In 1991, this amounted to rates of 11.99, 13.83, and 13.84 pf/kWh; in 1999, the rates were
11.93, 14.69 and 14.69 pflkWh, respectively. Lauber & Mez, supra note 18, at 1.
24
Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (1978)).
25
See Gutermuth, supra note 17, at 207.
26
Id. The security offered by the StrEG was not absolute. Because its payment price was tied
to retail prices, if prices dipped, which they did in some markets as the E.U. pushed for
liberalization and competition, some wind projects in the late 1990s became concerned about
profitability. This uncertainty was one of the factors that led to the EEG's adoption in 2000.
19

20
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be seen internationally "as one of the pioneering countries in the development
and application of [renewable energy sources]."
At the same time, the StrEG rendered Germany a kind of challenger on
renewable energy. One of the StrEG's express purposes was "to 'level the
playing field' for [renewables] by setting feed-in rates that took account of the
external costs of conventional power generation., 2 8 In this way, the StrEG
specifically sought to break the stranglehold of both incumbent utilities and
conventional generation sources on the electricity market. It aimed, in short, to
make electricity generation both more diverse and more democratic: more open
to smaller and more distributed resources and driven more by entrepreneurial
enterprises and individuals than large, monolithic utilities. Critically, however,
Germany's largest utilities "did not mobilise" to oppose the StrEG at the time,
"probably because they underestimated the importance of the law (which at
first was expected to play a minor role, mostly for small hydro)" and perhaps
because they were otherwise occupied with "taking over the East German
electricity sector during reunification., 29 Yet with the StrEG in place,
renewables gained a toehold toward breaking down the traditional German
electricity production system.
2.

Further Innovation: The Aachen Model and Broader
Renewable Policy

While the StrEG was "certainly the most significant" renewable energy
support mechanism in Germany during the 1990s, it was not the only one.30
The StrEG was adopted into a broader ecosystem of German renewable energy
policy. As had other countries, Germany began supporting research into
renewables following the oil crises of the 1970s, although the German
government's "main response" to those crises was to promote coal and
nuclear. Support for renewables "was chiefly a concession to dissenters."32
Nevertheless, by the late 1980s, the government had adopted two
important programs to promote renewable energy use: a 100 megawatt ("MW")
wind program and a 1,000-roof solar program. Under the former, the
government paid a subsidy of 3-4 Ecents/kWh to generators using wind energy,

Mischa Bechberger & Danyel Reiche, Renewable Energy Policy in Germany: Pioneering
and Exemplary Regulations, 8 ENERGY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 47, 49 (2004).
28
Lauber & Mez, supra note 18, at 3.
27

29

Id

Paolo Agnolucci, Use of Economic Instruments in the German Renewable Electricity
Policy, 34 ENERGY POL'Y 3538, 3539 (2006).
See Lauber & Mez, supra note 18, at 1.
31
30

32

Id
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with the goal of getting 100 MW of wind generation installed on the grid.
Similarly, under the 1,000-roof program, the government agreed to provide
70% of the costs necessary to install rooftop photovoltaic ("PV") panels. 34
"Eventually [2,250] roofs were equipped with PV modules, leading to about
five MW of installations."35 Part of the StrEG's success thus could be attributed
both to renewable energy's growing political support and to the ability to
combine StrEG rates with existing government subsidies.36
As pathmarking as the StrEG was, it was neither Germany's first nor
its last feed-in tariff innovation. The StrEG was a successor to a national
competition law, adopted in 1979, that obliged German electricity distributors
to purchase renewable energy at "avoided cost" rates 3 7-a principle familiar to
observers of PURPA in the United States. The StrEG also came on the heels
of voluntary agreements that utilities had entered into for the purchase of
renewables-based electricity. 39 The key difference in the StrEG was that it
increased the amount of compensation that renewables producers would
receive, and it made utility purchases mandatory rather than voluntary. Very
quickly, other FIT innovations made the StrEG's foundational support for
renewables even stronger.
In 1993, Aachen, a western German city of about a quarter-million
residents situated on the German-Dutch-Belgian border, 4 0 adopted a policy that
would eventually become the core idea used to overhaul the StrEG. Rather than
paying renewables producers a percentage of retail rates as the StrEG did,
Aachen established a solar feed-in tariff based on the technology's cost, plus an
adder to cover a modest investor profit. 4 1 Policymakers deemed this innovation
"revolutionary" because prior support mechanisms had tended to key subsidies
off of something external-conventional generation prices, retail electricity

3
Id. at 3; see also Bechberger & Reiche, supra note 27, at 49-50. The government later
increased the amount of generation eligible for the subsidy to 250 MW. Lauber & Mez, supra
note 18, at 3.
34
Lauber & Mez, supra note 18, at 3. Generally, the federal government paid 50%, and state
(Ldnder) governments paid 20%. Id. However, this breakdown was slightly different in some
states: 60% federal funds and 10% Ldnder funds. Id.
3
Id; see also Bechberger & Reiche, supra note 27, at 49-50.
36
See, e.g., Agnolucci, supra note 30, at 3359-60; Lauber & Mez, supra note 18, at 3-4.
3
See Lauber & Mez, supra note 18, at 1-2.
3
Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (1978)).
3
Gutermuth, supra note 17, at 207.
4
See General Information, AACHEN.DE, http://www.aachen.de/en/sb/ac/index.html (last
visited Mar. 4, 2014).
41
PEMBINA INSTITuTE, Cities Leading Global Renewable Energy Boom, in RENEWABLE
ENERGY FIT FOR CIIES: MAKING RENEWABLE ENERGY A PRIoRTY, at 2 (2010) [hereinafter Fact
Sheet], availableat http://www.pembina.org/pub/2133.
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prices, or environmental costs-rather than the price of the technology itself.4 2
What quickly became known as the "Aachen model" flipped this presumption
on its head. It looked to the cost of the technology rather than external factors.
In the early 1990s, the Aachen policy paid two Deutsche Marks per kWh-or
roughly twelve times the amount available under the StrEG-for solar energy. 43
This rate, moreover, unlike the StrEG's, remained constant for ten years.
Soon, others followed Aachen's lead. These included large cities such
as Bonn, Freiburg, Nuremburg, and Hamburg,4 5 plus many smaller locales,
including thirty different villages in Bavaria that adopted versions of the
Aachen model between 1994 and 1997.46 "The Aachen Model opened the door
for a completely new funding approach," Klaus Meiners, head of the Aachen
Department of Environment, observed.4 7 "[T]oday we still get visits from
government officials and experts from Japan who want to see it for themselves
on the spot."48
While the Aachen model pushed forward, others pulled back against
the StrEG. Political and legal challenges to the StrEG, including a complaint
filed with the European Commission that the law violated European Union
"state aid" rules, gained momentum, raising questions about the policy's longterm sustainability. 49 Eventually, "[a]n intense political battle ensued," with the
German Ministry of Economic Affairs proposing to reduce StrEG rates while
industry unions, environmental groups, renewable energy associations, and
churches joined forces in opposition.5 0
The Ministry's proposal lost narrowly in the Bundestag, the German
legislature's lower house,51 but the Energy Supply Industry Act of 1998

42
Paul Gipe, All About Solar Energy: The Aachen Solar TariffModel, WIND-WORKs
(Apr. 7,
2007),
http://www.wind-works.org/cms/index.php?id=38&tx-ttnews%5Btt-news%5D=227&
cHash=e088827563342ea235137c8e2e5f7cf6 (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
43
F. StaiB & A. Rduber, Strategies in Photovoltaic Research and Development-Market
IntroductionPrograms,in PHOTOVOLTAICS GUIDEBOOK FOR DECISION-MAKERS: TECHNOLOGICAL
STATUS AND POTENTIAL ROLE IN ENERGY EcoNoMY 243, 249 (Achim Bubenzer & Joachim
Luther eds., 2013); see also Fact Sheet, supra note 41, at 2.
4
Stai8 & Rtuber, supra note 43, at 243, 249.
45
Lauber & Mez, supra note 18, at 6; Stefanie Hallberg, On the Way to a C02 Neutral CityThe
Example
of
Aachen,
GOETHE
INSTITUT,

http://www.goethe.de/ges/umw/prj/kuk/the/arc/en9664671.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
46
47
48

49
50
51

Gipe, supra note 42.
Hallberg, supra note 45.
Id
See Lauber & Mez, supranote 18, at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
The Bundesrat, or Federal Council, is the upper house.
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modified the StrEG in two important ways. 52 Specifically, this 1998 law put in
place a tiered system in which upstream network operators would compensate
downstream distribution system operators to which renewables facilities
connected, if the connected facilities exceeded 5% of the downstream
operator's output.5 3 This was referred to as the "first ceiling," while a "second
ceiling" afforded compensation to the upstream o erator if the compensation
payments it had to make exceeded 5% of its output.?4
These reforms met mixed reviews.ss On one hand, they addressed a
persistent concern that the StrEG was unfair because it did not spread its costs
evenly over the nation. But the fight over how to amend the StrEG also created
"insecurity for investors and stagnating markets for wind turbines from 1996 to
1998.",56 It was thus a welcome change for renewable energy industries when,
in 1998, the governing coalition in Germany shifted, and the new Social
Democrat-Green government named renewable energy one of its key
environmental priorities. 7
3.

The EEG of 2000

The ensuing Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz ("EEG"), or "Renewable

Energy Sources Act," adopted in 2000, both cemented the StrEG's concept in
place and expanded the ways the prior law supported renewables. The EEG
added three planks to the StrEG's twin pillars of mandated renewable energy
purchases at premium prices. First, the EEG adopted the Aachen model and
decoupled feed-in rates from retail electric prices. In fact, the EEG raised "all
remuneration rates"-on average by ten percent, but for some sources much
more substantially.58 Solar PV rates, for instance, increased more than fivefold: from 8.52 to 50.62 Ecents/kWh.s' Second, the EEG promulgated fixed

52

See Lauber & Mez, supranote 18, at 5.

53

Id

Id. If an upstream operator did not have another operator that was further upstream from
whom it could collect its "second ceiling" compensation, the 1998 revisions specified that the
purchase obligation would no longer apply.
5
See id. at 4.
54

56

Id. at 5.

5

See Bechberger & Reiche, supra note 27, at 50.

58

Id. at 52.

5
Id.; see Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz [EEG] [Renewable Energy Sources Act], March 29,
2000, BUNDESGESETZBLAT, Teil I [BGBL. I] at 305, § 8 (Ger.) [hereinafter EEG 2000]. The
statute
is
available
at
http://www.gesetze-imGerman
version
of
the
at
is
available
English
version
The
intemet.de/bundesrechtleeg/gesamt.pdf.
http://www.emeuerbare-energien.de/fileadmin/ee-import/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/resact.pdf.
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periods of time that the feed-in rates would be paid-typically twenty years,
except for hydropower.6 0 Previously under the StrEG, the duration of tariff
payments was not specified. 6 1 Finally, the EEG created a stronger investment
incentive for renewables by prioritizing electricity produced from these
resources over others.62
Thus, under the EEG, the German FIT now bore several key features:
(1) the mandatory purchase of renewable electricity by grid operators, (2) at
cost-based tariff rates guaranteed for twenty years, (3) with a priority for
renewables use on the system, and (4) mandatory grid connection. Together,
each of these features sought to induce construction of more renewables by
reducing risk to investors, increasing remuneration rates for producers, and
lowering barriers to entry for non-incumbents.
The EEG implemented a number of other key changes to the StrEG
regime. To address concerns that the StrEG constituted unlawful state aid to
industry, the EEG made feed-in rates degressive, so that, for each plant, the
amount of compensation decreased in the years after the tariff took effect.63
Further, the EEG capped eligibility for solar facilities at an aggregate installed
capacity of 350 MW. 4 The law also put in place a biennial reporting
mechanism, to track progress toward renewable energy goals and propose rate
adjustments depending on how quickly those goals were met.65 And to expand
the FIT's reach, the EEG lifted the StrEG's ban on utility-owned facilities from
receiving remuneration, although it exempted facilities with a 25% or more
government (federal or Ldnder) ownership. 66
The EEG also clarified grid connection obligations and costs. Under
the StrEG, grid operators were required to connect to and purchase electricity
from renewable facilities, but the law "did not include any further
60
61

EEG 2000, supra note 59, at 305, § 9.
See Volkmar Lauber & Lutz Mez, Renewable Electricity Policy in Germany, 1974 to 2005,

26 BULL. OF SCI., TECH. & Soc'Y 105, 110 (2006).
62
EEG 2000, supra note 59, at 305, § 3(1); see also Bechberger & Reiche, supra note 27, at
52.
63
See, e.g., EEG 2000, supra note 59, at 305, § 5(2) (minimum compensation amounts for
new biomass installations shall be reduced by 1% annually); Id. § 8(5) (minimum compensation
amounts for new solar installations shall be reduced by 5% annually). For some resources,
degression took effect immediately. For others, such as geothermal and off-shore wind, it did not
take effect until several years after the FIT was effective, reflecting the reality that some projects
have longer development lead times.
6
Id. § 8 (2). This limit was later raised to 1,000 MW in 2002 "because 350 MW seemed
about to be surpassed already ... and the successful PV sector needed further planning security."
Bechberger & Reiche, supra note 27, at 53.
65
EEG 2000, supra note 59, at 305, § 12; see also Bechberger & Reiche, supra note 27, at
52.
66
EEG 2000, supra note 59, at 305, § 10(1); see also Agnolucci, supra note 30, at 3540.
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specifications regarding the sharing of costs." 67 The EEG filled this gap in two
ways: first, by specifying that renewable facilities had the right to connect at
the "technically and economically most suitable grid connecting point"; 68 and
second, by dictating that renewable facility operators would bear responsibility
for direct connection costs, but that grid operators would bear the costs for any
necessary grid upgrades from the facility coming online.
Finally, to address concerns that some regions of the country paid more
than their fair share of FIT costs-northern Germany tends to be windier while
more industry is located in the south-the EEG instituted a rate equalization
scheme. 70 This was the same problem the 1998 StrEG amendments sought to
fix, but the EEG struck more directly at the heart of the problem. Under the
EEG regime, local distribution system operators paid the feed-in tariffs, but
"they could now transfer [those costs] to the level immediately above themthe transmission system operators in their region. At this level, the four German
transmission system operators calculate[d] the total costs of renewable
electricity promotion and then distribute[d]" those costs "equally among all
supply companies."n In this way, the costs of the EEG were "equally
distributed among all German electricity consumers." 72 Eventually, the cost of
tariff payments imposed on consumers under the EEG's equalization scheme
came to be known as the Umlage: the "EEG surcharge" or "EEG fee."
The EEG was an immediate hit. It earned praise early and often for its
ability to get more and more renewables on the grid. As one set of observers
wrote, "The most important German [renewable energy] promotion measure in
the area of electricity is without any doubt the . . . EEG ....

Cracks in the system, however, soon emerged. Industry and
economically-minded political interests complained vociferously that the EEG
came with many flaws, including a heavy price tag. Thus, while administrative
oversight of the EEG switched from the economics ministry to the environment
ministry following the 2002 elections, the Economic Affairs Minister,
Wolfgang Clement, "attacked the very principle of the feed-in tariff and wanted
to replace it by a tender system, arguing that particularly for wind energy, rates
were excessive."7 4 Clement failed in his attempt to eliminate any FIT at all, but
in the ensuing amendments to the EEG, a pattern was established. Rates for

67

68
69
70

7
72

7
74

JACOBS, supra note 20, at 91.
EEG 2000, supra note 59, at 305, § 10(1).
Id. §§ 10(1)-(2); see also JACOBS, supranote 20, at 91-92.
EEG 2000, supra note 59, at 305, § 11.
JACOBS, supra note 20, at 83. This was sometimes referred to as the "EEG quota."
Id.; see also Agnolucci, supra note 30, at 3540.
Bechberger & Reiche, supra note 27, at 52.
Lauber & Mez, supra note 18, at 12.
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wind resources were reduced, and perhaps more important, a process of
repeatedly revising the EEG system every few years took hold. Whereas the
StrEG had remained basically steady for a decade, the question of what the
EEG would look like seemed quickly to become one presented by virtually
every election cycle.
4.

The 2004 EEG Amendments

The 2004 EEG amendments worked significant change to the law.
While keeping the basic structure of the EEG in place, they made numerous
other important modifications to its design.
The 2004 law declared official national renewable energy goals. To
comply with a European Union directive that Germany supply 12.5% of its
electricity from renewables,7 s the 2004 amendments stated a target of meeting
that goal by 2010, and a benchmark of 20% by 2020.76 The law further
provided that the environment ministry could establish an EEG "clearinghouse"
to provide an alternative dispute resolution forum for disputes between parties
over the law's implementation.77
Most fundamentally, the 2004 amendments altered FIT payments. For
onshore wind, these rates went down-from initial tariffs of 9.1 Ecents/kWh
under the 2000 EEG to 8.7 Ecents/kWh under the 2004 law.78 For others, they
went up. This was especially true for smaller facilities. Offshore wind, for
instance, kept an initial rate of 9.1 Ecents/kWh,79 small biomass facilities
increased from 10.23 to 11.50 Ecents/kWh,so and small geothermal climbed

7s
Council Directive 2001/77, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September
2001 on the Promotion of Electricity Produced from Renewable Energy Sources in the Internal
available at http://eur283)
33,
39,
O.J. (L
Market,
2001
Electricity
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:283:0033:0040:EN:PDF.
76
Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz [EEG] [Renewable Energy Sources Act], July 31, 2004,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL 1.] at 40, § 1 art. 1(2) (Ger) [hereinafter EEG 2004]. The English
version of the statute is available at http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/fileadmin/eeimport/files/english/pdflapplication/pdf/eegen.pdf.
n
EEG 2004, supra note 76, § 1 art. 19. The clearinghouse was established in 2007-the
ClearingstelleEEG. See English, CLEARINGSTELLE EEG, http://clearingstelle-eeg.de/english (last
visited Mar. 4, 2014).
78
Compare EEG 2000, supra note 59, at 305, § 7(1), with EEG 2004, supra note 76, at 40,
art. 10(1), § 1.
Compare EEG 2000, supra note 59, at 305, § 7(1), with EEG 2004, supra note 76, at 40,
7
art. 10(3), § 1.
80
Compare EEG 2000, supra note 59, at 305, § 5(1), with EEG 2004, supra note 76, at 40,
art. 8(1), § 1. Under the 2004 statute, the 10.23 rate applied to 500-kilowatt facilities, while the
11.50 cent rate applied to 150-kilowatt facilities. Id.
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from 8.95 to 15 Ecents/kWh.8 ' Solar, however, enjoyed perhaps the most
notable increase, from 50.62 to 57.4 Ecents/kWh, plus a 5 Ecent adder for nonbuilt up areas.82
Importantly, the 2004 amendments also created additional "banding"
within each resource, with different tariffs applicable to different-sized
facilities. For instance, under the 2000 EEG, biomass was broken down into
three subcategories: up to 500 kW, 500 kW to 5 MW, and 5 MW to 20 MW.83
Under the 2004 law, biomass now occupied five categories: up to 150 kW, up
to 500 kW, up to 5 MW, above 5 MW, and recycled timber.8 4 Other eligible
resources received similarly nuanced price treatment depending on their size,
and large hydropower facilities became elifible for FIT payments if expanded
or modernized in compliance with the law.
Further, the 2004 amendments changed the way the EEG's costs were
distributed. A 2003 adjustment exempted some large energy users from full
payment of EEG fees. The 2004 law made this exemption larger. Under the
2004 approach, intensive energy users (such as manufacturing and rail
operators) that purchased more than 100 GWh of electricity per year could
apply for exemption. Once exempted, they would be required to pay no more
than 0.05 Ecent/kWh for electricity they purchased derived from renewables.
Finally, the 2004 EEG expanded the law's application in a number of
ways. For solar, the 2004 amendments removed the 350 MW cap on PV." For
wind, the amendments extended the period for which offshore facilities could
receive full tariff payments under the 2000 EEG's "reference yield model."
Under this model, if a facility could demonstrate that it would meet a certain
percentage of the so-called "reference yield" wind site, the facility would
receive higher FIT payments than facilities that did not. 89 This, the environment
ministry asserted, "quash[ed] any economic incentive to install wind turbines

81

Compare EEG 2000, supra note 59, at 305, § 6(1), with EEG 2004, supra note
76, at 40,
art. 9(1), § 1.
82
Compare EEG 2000, supra note 59, at 305, § 8(1), with EEG 2004, supra note
76, at 40,
art. 11(2), § 1. The solar rates actually were increased in 2003. See Lauber & Mez, supra note 61,
at 110-12.
83
EEG 2000, supra note 59, at 305, § 5(1).
8
EEG 2004, supra note 76, at 40, art. 8(1), § 1.
85
Id. at 40, § 1,art. 6(2).
86
JACOBS, supra note 20, at 84-85.
87
EEG 2004, supra note 76, at 40, art. 16, § 1. Such entities also had to have a ratio of
electricity costs to gross value added greater than fifteen.
88
See id. § 1 art. 11.
89
Id § 1 art. 10(4).
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on sites with poor wind conditions."9 0 Under the 2000 law, offshore facilities
could receive these payments for nine years; under the 2004 amendments, that
period was extended to twelve years. 91 In addition, the 2004 amendments made
FIT payments available both for onshore wind facilities that "replace[d] or
modemize[d]" old "plants in the same rural district" and for facilities that "at
least triple[d] the installed capacity"-referred to as "repowering" facilitiesfor a certain period of time. 92
5.

The 2009 EEG Amendments

The 2004 amendments were hardly the end of the EEG's evolution.
Following those revisions, the German legislature began making a series of
rapid, successive changes to the law, particularly with respect to solar energy.
The 2009 amendments were perhaps most significant. With the Green
Party now out of power, the new coalition of Christian Democrats and Social
Democrats sought to make the FIT more market-responsive. The 2009 EEG
thus included a provision allowing renewables producers to sell their power
directly into the market, rather than feeding it to an upstream grid operator in
exchange for a tariff payment.9 3 This new provision allowed producers to make
this decision on a month-to-month basis, opting in and out of the FIT regime
with advance notice, 9 4 or to take a hybrid approach of selling a specified
portion of their output directly at market and collecting a tariff payment on the
rest.9 5 The idea was to help prepare renewables operators to fully enter the
market -an ultimate goal of FITs in the first place 9 6-by allowing them to take

90

FED. MINISTRY FOR THE ENv'T, NATURE CONSERVATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY (BMU),
THE RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES ACT (EEG) (2004), available at

AMENDING

http://www.senes.bas.bg/DE tariff.pdf.
9'
Compare EEG 2004, supra note 76, at art. 10(3), with EEG 2000, supra note 59, § 7(1).
Under both the 2000 and 2004 EEGs, the reference-yield period for onshore facilities was five
years.
92
EEG 2004, supra note 76, at art. 10(2).
93
Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz [EEG] [Renewable Energy Solutions Act], Oct. 25, 2008,
BGBL. I § 17 (Ger.) [hereinafter EEG 2009]. The German version of the statute is available at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/eeg_2009/gesamt.pdf. The English version of the
http://www.emeuerbare-energien.de/fileadmin/eeavailable
at
statute
is
import/files/english/pdfapplication/pdf/eeg_2009_en-bf.pdf.
94
EEG 2009, supra note 93, § 17(1).
95
Id. § 17(2). For an explanation of the choice of a one-month time period rather than a year
as Spain had used, see infraPart III.A, or a one-hour period as others had advocated, see JACOBS,
supra note 20, at 141.
96
A core objective of any renewables support regime is to make the resources commercially
competitive, but the German FIT, like most environmental policies, had many other goals as
well, including: to scale up renewable energy, to introduce new actors into the generation
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advantage of times when it is "financially more rewarding for green power
producers [to sell into the market] than [to] receiv[e] the fixed feed-in tariff."97
The 2009 EEG also provided requirements and incentives for
managing the intermittent nature of renewables, which by 2009 represented
16.3% of German electricity production.9 8 With that much production from
renewables, grid management had become more difficult. So the 2009 law
required installations of over 100 kW to utilize equipment that would allow
grid operators to manage their production, including reducing their "output by
remote means in the event of grid overload." 99 Further, in 2009, a "system
service bonus," or "SDL,"'o was implemented for wind facilities that could
help maintain grid stability.' 0 '
In addition, the 2009 EEG adjusted the tariffs themselves. In most
cases, these were upward adjustments. For instance, initial onshore wind tariffs
increased from 9.2 Ecents/kWh, 02 small biomass climbed to 11.67
Ecents/kWh,103 and the bonus for repowering existing wind facilities increased
by 0.5 Ecents/kWh.1 04 The 2009 EEG kept the degression rates stable for
biogas, biomass, geothermal, and small hydropower, but it reduced the amount
of degression for wind from 2 to 1% annually. 05 The 2009 amendments also
business, to create economies of scale to drive costs down, and to provide environmental benefits
such as climate change mitigation.
9
JACOBS, supra note 20, at 138.
9

FED. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV'T, NATURE

CONSERVATION

AND

NUCLEAR SAFETY,

RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES IN FIGURES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 13
(2013)
[hereinafter
BMU,
SOURCES
IN
FIGURES],
available
at
http://www.bmub.bund.de/fileadmin/Daten BMU/Pools/Broschueren/ee in zahlen enbf.pdf.
The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety has since
changed its name to the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building,
and Nuclear Safety.
9
EEG 2009, supra note 93, § 6. Grid operators could exercise this "technical control" over
renewables installations only if three criteria were met: (1) the "grid capacity ... would
otherwise be overloaded on account of that electricity," (2) the operator already "ensured that the
largest possible quantity of electricity" from renewables was purchased, and (3) the operator
"called up the data on the current feed-in situation in the relevant" part of the grid. Id. § 11.
100
The German term is Systemdienstleistungsbonus.See JACOBS, supra note 20, at 153.
101 Id.; see also EEG 2009, supra note 93, § 6. These were additional tariff payments
of 0.5
Ecents/kWh for new facilities and 0.7 Ecents/kWh for retrofitted windmills. See JACOBS, supra
note 20, at 153.
102
EEG 2009, supra note 93, §§ 29(l)-(2).
103

Id. § 27(1).

Id. § 30.
Compare Agnolucci, supra note 30, at 3541 (listing 2004 EEG tariff and degression rates
for renewable energy sources), with Matthias Lang & U. Mutschler, German Feed-in Tariffs
'04

105

2009, GERMAN ENERGY BLOG, http://www.germanenergyblog.de/?pageid=834 (last visited Mar.

5, 2014) (outlining the 2009 EEG tariff and degression rates for renewable energy sources).
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provided additional banding within small hydropower, mine gas, and roofmounted solar, although it simplified the banding for geothermal.106
By 2009, solar had become a dominant force in Germany, dramatically
increasing from 3,075 GWh of electricity production in 2007 to 6,583 GWh in
2009.107 The 2009 law thus sought to respond to this "considerable market"
expansion, aiming to rein in runaway growth in the PV market and ensure that
investors were not earning windfall profits as PV costs dropped with greater
economies of scale. 0 8
The law marshaled this effort in two parts. First, it reduced all of the
solar tariffs substantially. Small rooftop installations, for instance, had their
tariffs lowered from 57.4 Ecents/kWh under the 2004 law to 43.01 Ecents/kWh
under the 2009 EEG.109 Second, it modified the degression regime for solar. It
did so both by increasing solar tariff degression rates-from 5-6.5% to 8-10%
depending on the facility' o-and by making the amount of degression more
flexible. Under the prior EEG, degression rates were stable, with tariff
payments decreasing at a fixed percentage from year to year. The 2009 act,
however, made degression "responsive" to market growth."' The law instituted
a device known as the atmender Deckel-the "breathing cap."ll 2 Attempting in
yet another way to make sure the solar market did not overheat, the atmender
Deckel meant that degression would increase when more PV came online and
decrease if the market fell below expectations.' '1 Thus, under the 2009 EEG,
the solar degression rates for 2011 and 2012 would fluctuate upward by 1 to

106

107
108
109

no

See supranote 105.
BMU, SOURCES INFIGURES, supra note 98, at 18.
JACOBS, supra note 20, at 177.

Compare EEG 2004, supra note 76, at art. 11 § 2, with EEG 2009 §33(1).
Compare EEG 2004, supra note 76, at art. 11 § 5, with EEG § 20(2).

"I Jacobs uses the term "flexible" to describe the fluctuating nature of these degression rates.
See JACOBS, supra note 20, at 127. This kind of degression also has been described as
"responsive." See TOBY COUTURE ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., POLICYMAKERS'
DESIGN
41-42
(2010),
available at
TO
FEED-IN
TARIFF
POLICY
GUIDE

http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyI0osti/44849.pdf.
112
See Matthias Lang & U. Mutschler, Overview of Renewable Energy Sources Act, GERMAN
ENERGY BLOG, http://www.germanenergyblog.de/?pageid=283 (last visited Mar. 5, 2014).
While the literal translation is "breathing cap," the device sometimes also is referred to as the
"breathing ceiling" or "floating ceiling."
113

The level of expectation is known as the PV "corridor." See MARK FULTON
ET AL.,

DEUTCSHE BANK GRP., DB CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORS, THE GERMAN FEED-IN TARIFF: RECENT

POLICY

CHANGES

3

(2012),

available

at

http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBRINTERNETENPROD/PROD0000000000294376/The+German+Feed-in+Tariff:+Recent+Policy+Changes.pdf
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12% and downward by 2.5 to 7.5% from a statutory baseline depending on how
many PV installations were made in those years.1 14
6.

The 2010 EEG Amendments

Despite the 2009 EEG's effort to moderate explosive solar growth,
installations in 2009 and 2010 only exceeded expectations. As a result, by the
spring of 2010, a political debate was raging over whether and how to amend
the EEG yet again. In July 2010, the government finalized agreed-upon
changes, which sought to bring solar tariffs more in line with rapidly falling
technology costs. The 2010 EEG thus reduced solar payments significantly: by
16% for rooftop facilities, 15% for ground-mounted facilities, and 11% for
certain other plants." 5 These changes, moreover, were at least partially
retroactive. A portion of the cuts took effect for facilities installed October 1,
2010 or later, but the bulk of the reductions took effect July 1-before the
amendments were formally adopted."'6 The 2010 amendments also increased
the amount of degression that could apply to solar. Again, as in the 2009 EEG,
the amount of degression depended on the amount of installations made." 7
7.

The 2011 EEG Amendments

The next year brought only more change. Following the disaster at the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, the German government
announced that it would permanently shut down the nation's entire nuclear fleet
by 2022.' 18 Renewables thus assumed an even stronger spotlight in Germany,
with the expectation that they would make up the foregone nuclear capacity, or

EEG 2009, supra note 93, § 20(3).
Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz [EEG] [Renewable Energy Solutions Act], Aug.
11, 2010,
BUNDESGESETZBLATr, Teil I [BGBL. I] §§ 32-33 (Ger.) [hereinafter EEG 2010]. The German
version
of
the
statute
is
available
at
http://www.gesetze-imintemet.de/bundesrecht/eeg_2009/gesamt.pdf.
The
English version
is available at
http://www.emeuerbare-energien.de/fileadmin/ee-import/files/english/pdflapplication
pdf/eeg_2009_verguetungsdegression en bf.pdf. For sample tariff calculations, see FED.
114

115

MINISTRY FOR THE ENV'T, NATURE CONSERVATION, BUILDING AND NUCLEAR SAFETY, TARIFFS
AND SAMPLE EGRESSION RATES PURSUANT TO THE NEW RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES ACT OF 25
OF 11 AUGUST 2010, 12 (2010), available at
OCTOBER 2008 WITH AMENDMENTS

http://www.emeuerbare-energien.de/fileadmin/eeimport/files/english/pdflapplication/pdf/eeg_2009_verguetungsdegression-enbfpdf.
116
EEG 2010, supra note 115, § 66(4).
117
See JACOBS, supranote 20, at 125-26.
11
For more on the German government's response to Fukushima, see Lincoln L. Davies,
Beyond Fukushima: Disasters, Nuclear Energy, and Energy Law, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1937
(2011).
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nearly a quarter of German electricity production."' 9 The 2011 EEG
consequently announced even more aggressive renewable targets: 35% of
German electricity production by 2020, 50% by 2030, 65% by 2040, and 80%
by 2050.120 Germany's effort to transform its energy system away from nuclear
and conventional sources also took on a new name: Energiewende, or "energy
turnaround." Without question, the EEG thus became the core weapon in
Germany's arsenal for making the Energiewendea reality.
The 2011 amendments worked a number of other important changes to
the EEG. To "reflect market conditions and place downward price pressure on
developers and manufacturers," the 2011 EEG reduced tariff rates for all
resources except geothermal, offshore wind, and biomass.121 Further, the 2011
amendments adjusted degression rates upward for both wind and biomass: from
I to 1.5% and from 1 to 2%, respectively.12 2
The 2011 EEG also strengthened the incentive to engage in direct
marketing-part of the law's overall trajectory toward urging renewables
producers to become less reliant on fixed payments and more market-oriented.
Whereas before the choice to direct market came with significant market risk,
under the 2011 amendments facilities that chose to sell their power in this way
now received a so-called "market premium." By limiting investor risk, this
premium created heavy motivation to direct market renewable energy. 23 In
short, under the 2011 amendments, suppliers who chose to direct market their
energy could keep all of their above-FIT profits but potentially would be
heavily subsidized by the market premium for any market losses they

incurred.12 4
Finally, the 2011 amendments again modified solar tariffs. These
amendments called for biannual adjustments to the solar FIT on January 1 and

1"

Id. at 1949-50.

Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz [EEG] [Renewable Energy Solutions Act], Apr. 1, 2012,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] § 1(2) (Ger.) [hereinafter EEG 2012]. The German
version of the statute is available at http://www.emeuerbare-energien.de/fileadmin/eeimport/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/eeg_2012 bf.pdf. The English version of the statute
http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/fileadmin/eeat
available
is
import/files/english/pdf/application/pdf/eeg_2012_enbf.pdf.
120

121 FULTON, supranote 113, at 4.
122 Id. at n.12.
123 Id. at 7.

124 The premium was calculated as the difference between the otherwise applicable FIT rate
and a periodically determined "reference price." The reference price, in turn, was computed as
the average market price in the prior month, minus a technology-specific "management
premium" that sought to approximate the cost of renewables operators learning how to sell in the
spot market. EEG 2012, supra note 120, § 33g. For an excellent explanation of this scheme, see
FULTON, supra note 113, at 5-6.
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July 1 of each year, depending on recent PV deployments. 125 Thus, beginning
in July 2011, small rooftop facilities had a tariff of 28.74 Ecents/kWh, and
ground-mounted facilities had a FIT of 21.11 Ecents/kWh.12 6 The new tariff
allowed for up to 24% degression beginning in July 2012 if enough solar power

was installed.12 7
8.

The 2012 EEG Amendments

The brakes the 2011 amendments attempted to apply to the solar
market failed to have immediate effect.12 8 Germany added another 7,485 MW
of solar to its grid in 2011, on top of the 6,988 MW built in 2010.129 Indeed, by
2012, solar represented a remarkable 42.3% of installed German renewable
energy generating capacity.130
Thus, in July 2012, the EEG was amended again. These amendments
made four significant changes to the EEG. First, they decreased solar tariffs
once more-and heavily. Now, all facilities under 10 MW received an initial
FIT of 13.5 Ecents/kWh.' 3 1 Second, they limited the amount of energy that
could earn a tariff payment. For solar facilities between 100 kW and 10 MW,
the 2012 EEG declared that only 90% of their output would be FIT-eligible. 13 2
Third, the amendments modified the atmender Deckel so that FIT payments
now adjusted upward or downward each month depending on how much solar
was built in Germany during the prior year.' 33 Finally, the 2012 amendments
reintroduced a cumulative FIT cap for solar power. In this respect, the EEG
EEG 2012, supra note 120, § 20(a).
Id. § 32.
127
Id. § 20b. As it turned out, no additional degression occurred in 2011. However, because
5.2 GW of solar was installed between October 2010 and September 2011, a 15% degression rate
took effect in January 2012. Lang & Mutschler, supra note 112.
128
The point about immediate effect is important because the EEG changes did ultimately
change the market. Although price degression helped prices begin tracking cost evolution,
domestic factors and built-up momentum kept propelling the market forward. Eventually,
subsequent monthly degression, which was presaged by the 2011 amendments, realigned the
solar market more fundamentally. See, e.g., Jochen Diekmann et al., The ProposedAdjustment of
Germany's Renewable Energy Law - A CriticalAssessment, DIW ECONOMIC BULLETIN (June
2012),
http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw01.c.401744.de/diw-econbull_
2012-06-1.pdf.
129
BMU, SOURCES INFIGURES, supra note 98, at 18.
130
See id. at 20.
131 EEG 2012, supra note 120, § 32(1).
125

126

131

Id.

§ 33(1).

Id. § 20b. The 2012 amendments actually phased in the new monthly degression scheme in
three stages. For an explanation of this and the accompanying calculations, see FULTON, supra
note 113, at 18-19.
1
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came full circle-though the circle was much larger than the 350 MW limit
instituted by the original EEG. Under the 2012 amendments, once Germany
installs 52 GW of solar power, new solar facilities will no longer be eligible for

EEG payments. 134
The Impact of the German FITs: A Growing EEG Legacy

B.

It is hard to dispute the German feed-in tariffs' effectiveness. Since the
StrEG's adoption in 1990, German renewable installations and production have
only climbed, and the EEG simply magnified the effect. As a result, descriptors
that could only be considered hyperbolic in other contexts are nothing but
fitting in Germany: Explosive, nearly exponential, beyond expectationrenewables growth in Germany is all this and more.
Multiple metrics demonstrate the point. From 1990 to 2012, renewable
generation in Germany grew from 3.4% of the nation's gross electric
consumption to 23.5%. 135 This represents a monumental shift in renewable
electricity production: from 18,932 GWh in 1990 to 142,418 GWh in 2012.136
Likewise, the amount of renewable generation facilities in place on the grid
grew rapidly during this time. In 1990, Germany had 4,674 MW of installed
renewable generation. 137 In 2012, it had 77,121 MW.138
By any measure, these are remarkable changes: in just two decades, a
nearly sevenfold increase in the percentage of electricity generation, a more
than sevenfold increase in the gross amount of renewable electricity generated,
and a more than sixteen-fold jump in installed renewable capacity. Further,
every FIT-eligible renewable resource-hydropower, onshore and offshore
wind, biomass, photovoltaics, and geothermal-increased substantially from
1990 to 2012 in both installations and electricity produced, 139 although onshore
wind, photovoltaics, and biomass were the clear winners among the bunch.14 0
More to the point, the German FITs hold clear responsibility for these
growth trends. 14 1 While onshore wind began a growth spurt under the StrEG, it

134

EEG 2012, supra note 120, § 20b(9a).

1

BMU, SOURCES INFIGURES, supra note 98, at 18.

136

id.

137

Id. at 20.

138

id.

id at 18, 20.
Onshore wind grew from 71 GWh and 55 MW of installed capacity in 1990 to 49,948
GWh and 30,869 MW in 2012; solar PV increased from 1 GWh and 2 MW in 1990 to 26,380
GWh and 32,643 MW in 2012; biomass moved from 1,434 GWh and 635 MW in 1990 to 43,550
GWh and 7,557 MW in 2012. See id.
141
See Judith Lipp, Lessons for Effective Renewable Electricity Policy from Denmark,
Germany and the UnitedKingdom, 35 ENERGY POL'Y 5481, 5488 (2007).
19See

140
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absolutely took off under the EEG. The percentage of renewable electricity
generated in Germany jumped from 3.4% to 6.2% from 1990 to 2000, but it
leaped from 6.2% to 23.5% from 2000 to 2012.142 Commentators thus routinely
attribute Germany's success in renewables to the EEG.14 3 "Germany's feed-in
tariff program has been the key incentive structure in the country's successful
renewable energy industry ... . The incentives have worked."' 4 In fact, the
EEG far surpassed most observers'-and even its own-expectations.14 The
EEG blew past its goal of 12.5% renewable energy production by 2010 three
years early, in 2007, and it met its original objective of 20% by 2020 nine years
early, in 2011.146 Today, virtually no one questions whether the country will
meet its revised objective of producing more than a third of the nation's
electricity from renewables by 2020. Indeed, there are already many days when
solar production alone meets a full half of German electricity demand in some

hours.14 7
Much less clear are the German FITs' macroeconomic effects. The
German environment ministry ascribes extensive economic benefits to the
EEG. A 2013 government report, for instance, observes that employment in the
renewable energy sector expanded from 160,500 jobs in 2004 to 377,800 in
BMU, SOURCES INFIGURES, supra note 98, at 13.
See, e.g., FED. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV'T, NATURE CONSERVATION, AND NUCLEAR SAFETY,
EEG-THE RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCEs ACT 4, 13 (2007), [hereinafter BMU, EEG], available
at http://www.folkecenter.dk/mediafiles/folkecenter/pdf/eeg success _brochure-engl.pdf; Rainer
Hinrichs-Rahlwes, Renewable Energy: Paving the Way Towards Sustainable Energy Security
Lessons Learnt from Germany, 49 RENEWABLE ENERGY 10, 10-11 (2012), available at
http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0960148112000870/1 -s2.0-SO960148112000870-main.pdf?tid=04dl
aab0-9e82-1 1e3-9c73-00000aacb35f&acdnat=1 393376881 _d3e5bf6e3d68cf2
b514370cl799458e2.
14
Warren E. Mabee, Justine Mannion & Tom Carpenter, Comparing the Feed-in Tariff
Incentives for Renewable Electricity in Ontario and Germany, 40 ENERGY POL'Y 480, 482
(2012). In a series of interviews with nearly fifty German energy experts, the interviewees
unanimously agreed that the EEG has been effective at incenting renewables. See LINCOLN L.
142

143

DAVIES, RENEWABLE ENERGY PROMOTION IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES: A
COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT, REPORT FOR THE 2012-13 MCCLOY FELLOWSHIP IN ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICY (June 11, 2013) (on file with author).
145

See, e.g., CARSTEN ROLLE & DENNIS RENDSCHIIMDT, TRANSITION TO RENEWABLE ENERGY

SYSTEMS 68 (Detlef Stolten & Viktor Scherer eds., 2013); Manuel Frondel, Nolan Ritter &
Christoph M. Schmidt, Germany's Solar Cell Promotion: Dark Clouds on the Horizon, 36
ENERGY POL'Y 4198, 4198 (2008); see also BMU, EEG, supra note 143, at 14 ("The EEG has
caused an undreamed-of boom in renewable energy sources.").
146
See BMU, SOURCES IN FIGURES, supra note 98, at 13; see also Ole Langniss, Jochen
Diekmann & Ulrike Lehr, Advanced Mechanisms for the Promotion of Renewable Energy-Models for the Future Evolution of the German Renewable Energy Act, 37 ENERGY POL'Y 1289,
1290 (2009).
147

See CRAIG MORRIS & MARTIN PEHNT, ENERGY TRANSITION THE GERMAN ENERGIEWENDE

20 (2012).
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2012.148 The report suggests that "[a]bout 268,000" of these jobs "were due to
the effects" of the EEG.149 The same report notes £19.5 billion investments in
renewable energy in Germany in 2012, up from £10.6 billion in 2005,so and
concludes that "[a]s in the past, the greater part (85 percent) of the investment
was due to installations eligible for assistance under the [EEG]."' 5 ' The report
also finds that renewable energy consumption in the German electricity sector
saved the nation 63.9 billion in fossil fuel imports and reduced greenhouse gas
emissions by 101,148 tons in 2012.152
However, other studies have been less sanguine about the EEG's
ability to produce jobs and economic growth. Noting that increased energy
prices and investment in renewables can displace expenditures in other sectors
of the economy, so that net-not gross-job numbers must be analyzed, a 2008
study observed that "[s]everal recent investigations" cast "doubt on whether the
EEG's employment effects are positive at all." 53 Likewise, another 2008 study
funded by the German environment ministry projected a rather modest net
"positive labor effect" of 8,000 to 12,000 jobs from renewables by 2020, and
found that effect heavily dependent on export growth.15 4 "Without the
expansion of the international market," the article concluded, "the renewable
energy industry cannot contribute a large employment benefit to the German
economy." 5 5
In short, while EEG proponents often point to the law's economic bona
fides as reason to support the regime, others take issue with both the economic
evidence and the conclusions drawn from it. Despite the EEG's efficacy in
getting renewables built, a lack of consensus persists on its ability to promote
green economic growth in Germany.
Nor has the EEG succeeded in silencing dissenters about its impact on
energy costs. According to the German environment ministry, the EEG
surcharge has escalated just as rapidly as renewable energy growth. In 2001,

148

BMU, SOURCES INFIGURES, supra note 98, at 32.

149

Id.

is0

Id. at 31.

's'

Id.at 30.

Id. at 27, 29.
Frondel, supra note 145, at 4201 ("Taking account of adverse investment and crowding-out
effects, [one analysis] finds a negligible employment impact. Another analysis draws the
conclusion that the overall employment effects ... are negative, although it indicates initially
positive impacts. Similar results were obtained [in two other studies]."); see also Manuel Frondel
et al., Economic Impacts from the Promotion of Renewable Energy Technologies: The German
Experience, 38 ENERGY POL'Y 4048, 4053-54 (2010) [hereinafterEconomic Impacts].
154
Ulrike Lehr et al., Renewable Energy andEmployment in Germany, 36 ENERGY POL'Y 108,
116-17 (2008).
15s Id. at 117; see also Economic Impacts, supra note 153, at 4055-56.
152
153
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the Umlage was 0.25 Ecents/kWh.'16 In 2013, it was over twenty times that:
5.28 Ecents/kWh.'" Moreover, the swelling of the Umlage has been
particularly stark over the last four years, with increases from 2.05 Ecents/kWh
in 2010 to 3.53 and 3.59 in 2011 and 2012, respectively.'5 8 The four German
transmission system operators recently announced that the 2014 Umlage will be
even higher-6.24 Ecents/kWhl 59-and it could be yet higher still in 2015, with
a projected range between 5.85 and 6.86 Ecents/kWh.160
The Umlage's increase has a clear impact on electricity prices. German
electricity rates-already among the highest in the E.U.-have risen every year
since 2000, from 13.9 to 25.8 Ecents/kWh, and the proportionate share of the
EEG surcharge in that price has grown with it: from roughly 2% in 2002 to
over 14% in 2012.161 This amounts to nearly 620 billion paid out in tariff
compensation under the EEG in 2012, up vastly from well under 62.5 billion in
2000-and any amount paid in any year under the StrEG.162
Of course, it should only be expected that EEG payouts will increase if
the law is doing what it is supposed to: getting renewables built. But that logic
has not dissuaded feed-in tariff detractors from pointing to the law's impact on
electricity prices as reason to abandon the scheme. The clamor over EEG costs,
in fact, has become so loud in recent years that the environment ministry
recently saw fit to respond directly to the claim: "2013 has been marked by an
overheated discussion of costs in which the shift to renewable energy has been
characterised as the sole factor responsible for the rise in energy costs."' 63
Plainly, the Umlage presents policy design issues that eventually will have to
be addressed.'" Yet no amount of policy design correction can change the
fundamental fact that EEG costs long have been, and increasingly are, used as a
bludgeon to argue against the German FIT. That political resistance, in turn, is
one of the core obstacles the EEG now faces.

156

BMU, SOURCES IN FIGURES, supra note 98, at 38.

157

id.

158

Id.

159

Matthias Lang, Renewable SurchargeAccount Deficit Shrinks in September and October,
GERMAN ENERGY BLOG (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.germanenergyblog.de/?p=14720.
'16
Matthias Lang, EEG Medium Term Forecast:Likely EEG Surcharge in 2015 Between 5.85
15,
2013),
ENERGY
BLOG
(Nov.
and
6.86
ct/kWh,
GERMAN
http://www.germanenergyblog.de/?p-14760.
161 See BMU, SOURCES IN FIGURES, supra note 98, at 38-39.
162
See id. at 36.
163 Id. at 50.
'6

See infra Part I.C.
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Current Obstaclesfor the EEG: More Reform on the Horizon

As 2014 began, the EEG took up a peculiar place indeed. The feed-in
tariff that had been the exemplar for the world-the law the German
government called "an export hit," with eighteen countries in Europe alone
having adopted "statutory regulations based on the EEG"' 65-had also become
a feed-in tariff in turmoil.
Perhaps the greatest driver of this turmoil was the EEG's rising costor at least the appearance of its rising cost. Clearly, the EEG surcharge has
increased sharply in recent years,' 66 but the fact that the Umlage is on a steady
climb does not necessarily mean that EEG costs are spiraling out of control.
EEG costs were always going to be what they were going to be. Either facilities
would connect to the grid and take advantage of FIT payments or they would
not. The real cost of the EEG, then, is tied to the level the EEG tariffs have
been set at and the amount of resources taking advantage of them. Thus, to the
extent one seeks to lay blame for too-high EEG costs on any one thing, it might
more appropriately be put on high PV rates and the ensuing rapid uptake of
solar plants on the German system. Indeed, solar installations grew by nearly
73% from 2008 to 2009 alone, when Germany added 4,446 MW to the system,
and then continued to set record amounts of new installations in every
succeeding year since' 6 7-all while the EEG was repeatedly revised in an
attempt to slow this expansion.168
Despite this, the Umlage has become a symbol of EEG expense, both
because it is a ready target and because it has increased so quickly. Two design
flaws, however, exaggerate the Umlage's appearance of rising EEG costs.
First, the Umlage is tied to wholesale spot market costs, which creates
a paradox within the law. As renewables produce more energy, they necessarily
drive spot market prices down because their fuel costs are zero or low, and
because under the EEG they receive first priority for consumption. Indeed, it
has not been uncommon recently for the vast amount of renewables now on the
German grid to drive spot market prices close to zero-and on some sunny,
windy days actually to negative prices. The problem is that the Umlage shows
this as a cost, not a benefit. Because the Umlage is measured by the difference
between the applicable EEG rate and the spot market price, when wholesale
prices go down, the Umlage goes up. Thus the paradox: The more successful
the EEG is at putting downward pressure on wholesale prices, the more upward
pressure is placed on the Umlage.

165

BMU, EEG, supranote 143, at 21.

'

See supra notes 135-164 and accompanying text.
See BMU, SOURCES IN FIGUREs, supra note 98, at 20.

167
168

See supra Part II.A.
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Second, because the Umlage does not fully apply to large energy users
that have received an exemption, when EEG surcharge costs rise, they are felt
more sharply by consumers because they are spread over a smaller pool.169
Indeed, in 2012, "a total of 734 companies in the manufacturing sector and
railways profited" from the EEG's hardship exemption, 170 accounting for 86
billion kWh of German electricity consumption-or "nearlr 18 percent of the
total power consumption subject to the allocation system."' 7
Consequently, while the EEG already has been substantially revised on
multiple occasions since its adoption, calls to reform the law even further have
become only more common over the last year. In February 2013, for instance,
economics minister Philipp R6sler took the spotlight when he proposed cutting
changes to the EEG, including mandating direct marketing for all but small
renewable installations, reducing or eliminating payments to facilities that have
to temporarily stop operation to ensure grid stability, and slashing what he
termed "excessive payments" under the EEG for wind producers.172
Environment minister Peter Altmaier then became a lightning rod for attention
himself when he agreed that R6sler's proposed changes should be
considered.' 7 3 Otherwise, he suggested, "the costs for the German
Energiewende
74 could add up to a trillion Euros 'by the end of the thirties of this

century."'l

EEG-related costs, moreover, are bound only to increase, particularly
given the continually growing amount of installations on the system and the
upgrades to the grid necessary to support them. As the environment ministry
has observed, the "massive expansion" of renewables has created an "urgent
need" for "electricity highways"-"transmission lines to carry electricity from
wind farms to centres of consumption, which will also be able to act as a kind
of 'bypass' in the short term to avert critical situations in the grid." 75
See BMU, SOURCES INFIGURES, supra note 98, at 38.
170
Id. at 37.
171 Id. at 37-38.
172 Matthias Lang, Economics Minister Rdsler Callsfor Binding Direct Marketing Obligation
for Solar and Wind Power, GERMAN ENERGY BLOG (Feb. 12, 2013),
http://www.germanenergyblog.de/?p=12193.
1"
See Eckhart K. Gouras, Intersolar China: Ambitious Targets and Emerging Markets, PV
MAGAZINE (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/intersolarchina-ambitious-targets-and-emerging-markets_100009576/.
174
Matthias Lang, MinisterAltmaier: EEG Cuts Needed-or Energiewende Costs Will Reach
20,
2013),
GERMAN
ENERGY
BLOG (Feb.
Trillion Euro Mark by 2040,
http://www.germanenergyblog.de/?p=12278 (quoting Minister Altmaier).
169

1" FED. MINISTRY FOR THE ENv'T, NATURE CONSERVATION, AND NUCLEAR SAFETY,
RENEWABLE ENERGIES: DRIVING GERMANY'S ENERGIEWENDE 38 (2012), available at

http://www.bmub.bund.de/fileadmin/DatenBMU/Pools/Broschueren/Motor-der-Energiewende
eng bf.pdf.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss3/8

28

Davies and Allen: Feed-In Tarrifs in Turmoil
FEED-INTARIFFS IN TURMOIL

2014]

965

To be sure, the EEG's grid expansion costs will be no small matter. In
2012 alone, EEG-related costs of grid expansion climbed to C460 million, or
almost three times the 2011 figure and nearly twelve times the 2008 cost of E40
million.' 7 6 Other estimates anticipate that Germany needs to invest between E10
and 620 billion by 2022, and between E27.5 and C42.5 billion by 2030, in
further grid expansion efforts depending on how quickly more renewables are
installed. 177
And there is the EEG rub. Cost comes back again and again. Cost has
dominated the EEG discussion so heavily recently, in fact, that media reports
have begun to characterize the German renewable energy transition as
"reckless," 17 8 a "disaster,"179 a "defective . . . game plan," 80 and as creating
"chaos."' 8 ' The popular magazine Der Spiegel ran a cover story in August 2013
entitled "Luxury Power"-the "High Costs and Errors of the German
Transition to Renewable Energy."' 2 Meanwhile, Michael Fuchs, deputy
parliamentary floor leader for the Christian Democrats, has called promises to
keep the Umlage stable a "utopian" dream,' 83 and Maria van der Hoeven,

See FED. MINISTRY FOR THE ENv'T, NATURE CONSERVATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY,
RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES IN FIGURES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 52
176

(2013),
available
at
http://www.emeuerbare-energien.de/fileadmin/DatenEE/
DokumentePDFs_/ee-inzahlenenbf.pdf; Ulrike Lehr, Presentation at the 2013 Global
Energy Systems Conference: The Benefits and Costs of Renewable Energy Deployment 8 (June
27,
2013)
[hereinafter
Lehr
Conference
Presentation],
available
at
http://globalenergysystemsconference.com/wp-content/uploads/presentations/GES2013Day2
Session2_UlrikeLehr.pdf.
17
Lehr Conference Presentation, supra note 176, at 8; Jabeen Bhatti, The Cost of Green:
Germany Tussles Over the Bill for Its Energy Revolution, TIME WORLD (May 28, 2013),
http://world.time.com/2013/05/28/the-cost-of-green-germany-tussles-over-the-bill-for-its-energyrevolution/.
178
Frank Dohmen et al., Germany's Energy Poverty: How ElectricityBecame a Luxury Good,
SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/high-costsand-errors-of-german-transition-to-renewable-energy-a-920288.html.
179 Howard Rich, Germany's Green Energy Disaster: A Cautionary Tale for World Leaders,
FORBES, Mar. 14, 2013.
180
Alexander Neubacher, Reality Check: Germany's Defective Green Energy Game Plan,
SPIEGEL

ONLINE

INT'L

(Oct.

25,

2013),

http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/germany/commentary-why-germany-is-waging-its-greenrevolution-wrong-a-929693.html.
181 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Germany Industry in Revolt as Green Dream Causes Cost
Spiral,
TELEGRAPH
(Sept.
19,
2013),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/10321173/Germany-industry-in-revoltas-green-dream-causes-cost-spiral.html.
182
Dohmen et al., supra note 178.
183 Peter Miller & Alexander Neubacher, Spiegel Interview with Michael Fuchs: Solar
Subsidy 'Insanity' Will Cost Consumers, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L (Jan. 18, 2012),
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executive director of the International Energy A ency, referred to the high
price of German electricity as "a warning signal.", Even environment minister
Peter Altmaier echoed these concerns. "The price of electricity has to remain a
tolerable burden," Altmaier said in June 2012. "We can't allow electricity to
become a luxury." 8 5
Thus, as 2013 drew to a close, the new governing coalition in Germany
agreed on a draft proposal to overhaul the EEG yet again.' 86 The coalition
presented this legislation in early April 2014, aiming to make a bevy of changes
to the EEG. Binding targets for renewable energy production would go up (to
40% or 45% in 2025 and 55% or 60% in 2035), but tariff rates would decrease,
particularly by removing bonuses for wind and biomass. The bill would
introduce renewable energy target "corridors" for different resources-2,500
MW of planned growth per year for onshore wind and solar and 100 MW per
year for biomass-and it would decrease goals for offshore wind from the
current target of 25 GW in 2030 to 15 GW. To keep tariff rates in line with
these corridors, the bill also would apply "breathing caps" modeled on the
current solar atmenderDeckel to onshore wind and biomass, adjusting their FIT

rates quarterly. Direct marketing would be mandated for all but small
installations and other facilities unable to market their own power. Finally,
beginning in 2017, tariff levels will be set by an auction process, rather than
legislatively.187
Of course, the ultimate details of this EEG reform cannot be predicted.
The introduced bill still must move through parliamentary process. The fact,
however, that it appears the EEG is about to be revamped yet again is telling
indeed. That FITs-which are premised on the very idea that they provide
investor confidence-demand increasing adaptation and change over time
necessarily begs the question of how long-lasting these regimes can be. That
inherent policy uncertainty-not well advertised but undeniably present in
these laws-is, in short, a core message of feed-in tariffs in turmoil.

http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/germany/spiegel-interview-with-michael-fuichs-solarsubsidy-insanity-will-cost-consumers-a-809529.html.
'm
Bhatti, supra note 177 (quoting MARIA VAN DER HOEVEN, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
AGENCY REPORT, ENERGY POLICIES OF IEA COUNTRIES-GERMANY 2013 REVIEw (2013)).
185
Konstantin von Hammerstein & Peter Miler, Environment Minister Peter Altmaier:

'We
Can't Allow Electricity to Become a Luxury,' SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L (June 6, 2012),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-environment-minister-discusses-fresh-startin-energy-revolution-a-837012.html.
186
Matthias Lang, CDU/CSU and SPD Present Coalition Agreement-55% to 60%
Renewables by 2035 and More, GERMAN ENERGY BLOG (Nov. 27, 2013),
http://www.germanenergyblog.de/?p=14825.
187
Matthias Lang, EEG 2.0: Cabinet Adopts Renewables Law Amendment Bill - Agreement
with Brussels on EEG Surcharge Reductions for Industry, GERMAN ENERGY BLOG (Apr. 8,
2014), http://www.germanenergyblog.de/?p=15647.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss3/8

30

Davies and Allen: Feed-In Tarrifs in Turmoil
2014]

FEED-IN TARIFFS IN TURMOIL

967

III. SPAIN
The story of Spain's feed-in tariff is in many ways a mirror image of
Germany's. Spain, like Germany, had rapid and extensive success with its FIT.
Spain, like Germany, now stands out as a nation whose feed-in tariff system is
in turmoil. Yet the reasons Spain's FIT is roiled in difficulty today strike a
sharp contrast to the uncertainties Germany's law faces.
Since it adopted its FIT in 1994, Spain quickly rose to become the
second largest producer of renewable energy in Western Europe, behind only
Germany. Spain seized this status largely through its FIT, which guaranteed the
purchase of renewable energy at premium prices for long periods of time, by
generous government subsidies for renewable projects, and via massive bank
loans available to solar producers.' 88 Despite its success at incentivizing
renewable energy production, however, the Spanish FIT regime proved to be
politically unsustainable, in no small part because of the law's design. By 2013,
Spain racked up a huge tariff deficit and determined that reevaluating-and
eventually eliminating-its FIT was necessary to increase efficiency and
reduce costs. 1 89 Thus, unlike Germany, which so far has managed to keep its
FIT afloat through constant modification and adaptation to changing
circumstances, Spain's efforts to perpetuate its law were unable to save it from
demise.
A.

The Spanish FIT: Birth and ConstantEvolution

Spain built its FIT on top of existing policy promoting renewable
energy. Like other countries, early renewable energy support in Spain was
adopted out of concern over escalating oil prices and the risks of depending on
imported fossil fuels. Although environmental motives were "virtually absent at
the time,"' 90 this early support for renewables laid the foundation for later
adoption of a FIT.

Infra Section III.B.
See Craig Morris, Spanish Feed-In Tariffs-A Wrapup, RENEWABLES INT'L (July 22, 2013),
http://www.renewablesinternational.net/spanish-feed-in-tariffs-a-wrapup/I 50/537/71424/.
188
189

190

Valentina Dinica, Renewable Energy Policies in Spain, in HANDBOOK OF RENEWABLE

ENERGIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: CASE STUDIES OF ALL MEMBER STATES (Danyel Reich ed.,
2002).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2014

31

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 116, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 8
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

968

1.

[Vol. 116

Origins of the Spanish FIT: Reducing Fossil Fuel Dependence

In the wake of the 1970s oil crises, Spain in 1980 passed Law
82/19801' supporting renewable energy production. The law implemented
three major legal protections for renewables, upon which later FIT policies
were built: "network connection, purchase contracts with utilities, and a certain
guaranteed price."' 92 The law adopted these features in an effort to remove
barriers for independent electricity generators to connect with incumbent grid
operators, so long as new connections would not cause a disruption to the
normal functioning of the electricity system. Specifically, under the 1980 law,
renewable generators received a price for their electricity, set by the Ministry of
Energy and Industry and paid by the utilities, for any power produced beyond
the facility's needs. 9 3
While these features of the 1980 law would later become paradigmatic
of the Spanish FIT, the law's main thrust was providing tax benefits,
government subsidies, and third-party financing of renewable plants through
tax incentives on loans.1 94 These benefits applied to a large category of
individuals and companies that developed, modified, and improved
efficiencies, or took other actions, to reduce Spain's oil dependence. For
example, the law included as its beneficiaries individuals who improved home
insulation and companies that developed energy efficient industrial practices.'9 5
Since it was motivated largely by a spike in oil prices, enthusiasm for
Spain's renewable energy policy waned when the costs of imported fossil fuels
dropped. 196 Thus, the government did not implement new binding renewable
support mechanisms in the latter half of the 1980s.197 Nevertheless, Law

Ley 82/1980, de 30 de desembre, sobre conservaci6 d'energia [Law on the Conservation of
available
at
1980,
1898),
Energy]
(B.O.E.
http://www.boe.es/boecatalan/dias/1981/12/3 l/pdfs/A00005-00009.pdf.
192
Id. at 5.
193 Pablo del Rio Gonzdlez, Ten Years ofRenewable Electricity Policies in Spain:An Analysis
ofSuccessive Feed-In TariffReforms, 36 ENERGY POL'Y 2917, 2918 (2008).
191

194

Id

Ley 82/1980, de 30 de desembre, sobre conservaci6 d'energia [Law on the Conservation of
at
1898),
available
(B.O.E.
1980,
Energy)
http://www.boe.es/boecatalan/dias/1981/12/3 1/pdfs/A00005-00009.pdf.
196
Pere Mir-Artigues, The Photovoltaic Crisis and the Demand-Side Generation in Spain 1
(University of Cambridge, Electricity Policy Research Group, Working Paper No. 1307, 2013);
19s

see also INTERNATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY AND GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL, 30
YEARS OF POLICIES FOR WIND ENERGY: LESSONS FROM 12 WIND MARKETS 114-15 (2013),

availableat https://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENAGWEC
WindReportFull.pdf.
197
Spain adopted other regulations relevant to renewables in the 1980s, including, for
example, the National Energy Plan, which set a policy goal of encouraging renewables. See Real
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82/1980 had several direct long-term impacts. First, it bolstered the country's
renewable energy production, primarily from hydropower, which, as of 1990,
generated 977 GWh.19 8 More importantly, the law established a political
precedent for the Spanish government's efforts to promote renewables. As one
commentator later noted, the 1980 law was "the first policy document
providing a justification for the support of [renewable energy]" in Spain-a
policy that would be expanded significantly in the years to come. 99
2.

Building Spain's FIT: Royal Decree 2366/1994

Spain took the next step in incentivizing renewable technologies in
1994.200 In that year, Spain adopted Royal Decree20 1 2366/1994.202 Building off

the 1980 law's structure, this decree instituted the country's first true FIT. It
had three core features. First, the law required electricity distributors to
purchase excess energy from renewable energy producers in six eligible
technological groups.203 Second, the law set initial tariffs for these purchasesas much as "36 [Ecents] for small-scale solar plants" and 5 Ecents for most
other renewableS20 4-and tied those tariffs, with annual adjustments, to
electricity price inflation. Under the decree, these payments would be made for
a minimum of five years. Third, the decree created subsidies of up to 20% of
up-front costs for renewable energy projects.20 5

Decreto 2366/1994, de 9 de diciembre, sobre producci6n de energia eldctrica por instalaciones
hidrdulicas, de cogeneraci6n y otras abastecidas por recursos o fuentes de energia renovables
[Law on Production of Electrical Energy by Hydraulic Systems, Cogeneration and Others
Supplied by Renewable Energy Sources] (B.O.E. 1994, 28980), available at
http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1994-28980.
198
Gonzalez, supra note 193, at 2918.
199

Id

Id. at 2923.
Subsequent FIT laws and policies frequently took the form of Royal Decrees.
Royal
Decrees are a type of regulation adopted by the executive power of the central government or
governments that implement, develop, or supplement laws. See Official State Bulletin, N-LEX,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/n-lex/info/infoes/indexen.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2014).
202
Real Decreto 2366/1994, de 9 de diciembre, sobre producci6n de energia elictrica
por
instalaciones hidrdulicas, de cogeneraci6n y otras abastecidas por recursos o fuentes de energia
renovables [Law on Production of Electrical Energy by Hydraulic Systems, Cogeneration and
Others Supplied by Renewable Energy Sources] (B.O.E. 1994, 28980), available at
http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1994-28980.
203
Id. The law defined such surplus electricity as the balance resulting from the electricity
sent to the grid from a facility and the amount received from the grid at that facility.
204
J.P.M SUM, ENERGY RESEARCH CENTRE OF THE NETHERLANDS (ECN), THE PERFORMANCE
OF FEED-IN TARIFFS TO PROMOTE RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 12 (2002).
205
Pere Mir-Artigues, supra note 196, at 1.
200

201
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Spain's early adoption of a FIT was partly a reaction to the growing
international awareness about fossil fuels' environmental costs, including
climate change.206 However, the major motivation for the law was its potential
to spur economic growth: Germany's and Denmark's early successes with their
feed-in tariffs influenced Spain's choice to adopt a FIT, a choice later
underscored by E.U. directives for national renewable energy development.2 07
Domestically, Spain's main energy regulatory and consultative body,
the National Energy Commission ("CNE"), a part of the Ministry of Industry,
Tourism, and Trade, advocated for supporting renewables. The argument was
that heavier reliance on renewables would be a step towards a more secure
domestic energy supply, with the benefit of creating new employment
opportunities. 208 The CNE acknowledged the potential risk of perceived
windfall profits to renewable producers, as well as the possibility of higher
electricity costs.209 Yet the commission predicted that initial economic impacts
would not be acute since retail electricity costs remained regulated. Ultimately,
these limits on electricity prices would prove to be part of the FIT's undoing,
but in the short term, they also made the program's adoption politically
feasible.2 10
Forging the Spanish FIT, however, did not come without effort. The
pro-renewables sentiment was not the only one at play, and several wellorganized domestic groups with a stake in electricity policy pushed back
against the idea. For example, Red Eldctrica de Espala ("REE"), which
manages the nation's electric grid, 2 11 emphasized the importance of grid access
and stability. REE worried that a Spanish FIT could undermine grid stability. 2 12
Likewise, major traditional electric utilities saw new technologies, including
renewables, as competitors in their domain, and were accused by at least some

206
See Carlos Padr6s & Endrius E. Cocciolo, Security of Energy Supply: When Could
National Policy Take Precedence over EuropeanLaw, 31 ENERGY L. J. 31, 36 (2010).

207
Gonzalez, supra note 193, at 2923; see Marc Ringel, Fostering the Use of Renewable
Energies in the European Union: The Race Between Feed-In Tariffs and Green Certificates, 31
RENEWABLE ENERGY 1, 5 (2006) ("With the Kyoto-Protocol on climate change having come into
effect in February 2005, the member states of the EU have accepted binding emission reduction
targets.").
208
GonzAlez, supra note 193, at 2923.
209
id. at 2919.
210
See Jos6 Luis Garcia Ortega & Emilio Mendndez Nrez, Spanish Renewable Energy:
Successes and UntappedPotential, in RENEWABLE ENERGY POL'Y AND POLITICS: A HANDBOOK
FOR DECISION-MAKING 215, 217 (Karl Mallon ed., 2006); see also La Asociaci6n, ASOCIACI6N
DE PRODUCTORES DE ENERGiAS RENOVABLES, http://www.appa.es/02appa/02asociacion.php (last

visited Mar. 5, 2013).
211
GonzAlez, supra note 193, at 2923.
212
Id. at 2924.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss3/8

34

Davies and Allen: Feed-In Tarrifs in Turmoil
FEED-INTARIFFS IN TURMOIL

2014]

971

of "using grid access as a major obstacle to renewable energy
developments."2 13
In the years following the 1994 Royal Decree, a pattern of new laws
and decrees superseding older regulations emerged. Much as in Germany, this
occurred as the government frequently adjusted technology-specific tariffs up
or down to avoid market stagnation or out-of-control growth. Likewise, market
feedback compelled the adoption of regulations on issues that previously had
not been considered important but that gained greater significance as renewable
penetration increased.214 Perhaps most notably, and ultimately most troubling
for the Spanish FIT, was the decision-quite opposite from Germany-late in
the twenty-first century's first decade to decouple FIT payments from market
prices, thus providing enhanced financial certainty for investors just as PV
panel costs were declining. As a result, developers flooded the market, and the
Spanish FIT became overwhelmed. Meanwhile, however, the Spanish
government continued to modify the FIT.
3.

The 1997 "Special Regime" and Royal Decree 2818/1998

A key adjustment strengthening the Spanish FIT took place in 1997. In
that year, the Law of the Electricity Sector went further than the previous royal
decree by establishing a "Special Regime" giving priority treatment to
renewables.2 15 Much as did the 2000 EEG in Germany, this Special Regime
required distributors to purchase electricity from qualifying renewable plants
before energy from conventional generators.216 The law also reaffirmed grid
access for renewable producers and specified price support for individual
renewable energy technologies.217
The following year, Royal Decree 2818/1998 adopted procedures to
implement the 1997 law.218 The 1998 decree (1) established new renewable
energy targets and (2) modified the FIT pricing structure. Specifically, the

213
Ortega & Pdrez, supra note 210, at 221. However, these utilities generally quickly dropped
their opposition in light of the generous government subsidies and incentives, and participated in
the renewable electricity market. Gonzalez, supra note 193, at 2923.
214
Gonzalez, supra note 193, at 2924.
215
Pablo del Rio & Miguel A. Gual, An IntegratedAssessment of the Feed-In Tariff System in
Spain, 35 ENERGY POL'Y 944, 998 (2007).
216
Spanish
Electricity
System,
ENERGIAS
DE
PORTUGAL,
http://www.edp.pt/en/aedp/sectordeenergia/sistemaelectricoespanhol/Pages/SistElectES.aspx
(last visited Mar. 5, 2014).
217
id
218
Gonzilez, supra note 193, at 2918.
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decree implemented the E.U.'s mandate that renewables account for 12% of
Spain's gross energy supply by 20 10.219
The 1998 decree also amended the FIT's pricing structure. Under this
decree, distributors would pay the premium rate to renewable energy
producers. 2 20 Distributors would then pass the FIT costs on to the CNE, which
would determine how those costs would land with consumers. 2 2 1 The 1998
decree anticipated that the government would periodically consider market
prices and technological developments, and adjust tariff rates accordingly.222
Additionally, the 1998 decree instituted a FIT pricing innovation thenunique to Spain. Similar to the market premium model later adopted in
Germany, this innovation allowed renewables producers to choose between
fixed-price and fixed-premium tariff rates.223 The fixed price provided a total
payment per kWh of renewable electricity, while the fixed premium granted a
payment per kWh on top of the wholesale market price. 224 Producers' choice of
tariff structure was valid for one year and could be changed after each year.22 5
4.

Royal Decree 436/2004

Partially in response to the effects of earlier royal decrees, Spain again
modified its FIT framework in 2004 with Royal Decree 436/2004.226 This
decree continued the regulatory framework established in 1997 and 1998 but
Id. Spain increased its target the following year to 29.4% of electricity from renewables
by
2010. Id
220
Gonzdlez, supra note 193, at 2918.
221
Setting the actual price for consumers, however, was a complex process, involving
consultation by CNE with legislative bodies, and consideration of price regulations, electricity
bidding and auctions, international integration, and other factors. For more detail, see Giulio
Federico, The Spanish Gas and Electricity Sector: Regulation, Markets and Environmental
Policies (IESE Bus. Sch., OP-187, 2011), available at http://www.iese.edu/research/pdfs/op0187-e.pdf.
222
Rio & Gual, supra note 215, at 998.
223
Julieta Schallenberg-Rodriguez & Reinhard Haas, Fixed Feed-In Tariff Versus Premium:
A
219

Review of the Current Spanish System, 16 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 293, 293

(2012).
224
Id
225
See Mario Ragwitz & Claus Huber, Feed-In Systems in Germany and Spain and
a
Comparison,

FRAUNHOFER

INST.

SYs.

&

INNOVATION

RES.

8-9,

available

at

http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/fileadmin/ee-import/files/english/pdflapplication/pdfl
langfassung_ einspeisesysteme-en.pdf.
226
Real Decreto 436/2004, de 12 de marzo, por el que se establece la metodologia para la
actualizaci6n y sistematizaci6n del rdgimen juridico y econ6mico de la actividad de producci6n
de energia eldctrica en regimen especial [Law Establishing the Methodology for the Update and
Systemization of the Legal and Economic System of Electric Production in the Special Regime]
(B.O.E. 2004, 5562), availableat http://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2004-5562.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss3/8

36

Davies and Allen: Feed-In Tarrifs in Turmoil
2014]

FEED-INTARIFFS IN TURMOIL

973

went beyond the former laws in two important ways. First, it addressed the
impact of renewables, particularly the huge influx of wind capacity, on national
grid stability. Second, it adjusted tariff rates, namely, to encourage PV.227
By 2004, the Spanish FIT had noticeably altered the nation's electricity
system. The 1998 decree proved to be a powerful force in overcoming
institutional inertia of conventional electricity, at least with respect to wind: As
of 2004, Spain was second only to Germany in installed onshore wind
228
even though from 1999 to 2003 Spain annually decreased its FIT
capacity,
rates for wind as technology costs also fell. 2 29
This rapid influx of wind capacity, however, changed the way the
Spanish grid operated, and the 2004 decree set out to address the problem.
Before the 2004 decree, the FIT did not restrict renewable generators' ability to
deviate from what they predicted they would supply to the grid in terms of
energy actually delivered. The new decree required operators to forecast 30
hours in advance the electricity they anticipated they would feed into the grid,
and it imposed new penalties on producers for delivery deviations.230
Specifically, the deviation requirements allowed solar and wind generators a
20% tolerance limit and gave other renewable technologies a 5% leeway. 231 For
producers utilizing fixed tariffs, deviations beyond these amounts resulted in
penalties of 10% of the average electricity tariff, applied to the amount of
deviation beyond the tolerance limit. And producers using market-based tariffs
were subject to the same deviation penalties as traditional operators.232
While the Spanish FIT made strides in wind, it was not nearly as
effective at promoting solar. By the end of 2003, only 28 MW of PV had been
installed in Spain.233 Accordingly, the 2004 decree sought to increase
photovoltaic installations. It encouraged PV by raising the fixed tariff rate for
PV plants of up to 100 kW to a rate 575% greater than the average price of

227

id.

228 Pablo Del Rio & Gregory Unruh, Overcoming the Lock-Out of Renewable Energy
Technologies in Spain: The Case of Wind and Solar Electricity, 11 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE
ENERGY REvs. 1498, 1502 (2007). Growth in onshore wind was largely from medium- to largesized wind farms made up of a "consortia of power utilities, regional government and turbine
manufacturers." Id. at 1502-03.
229
See id at 1502 & 1505. Despite the FIT's success, criticisms of the annual revisions to its
rates-and delays in permitting new installations-were persistent. See id at 1505 ("The
implementation of wind farms is affected by 60 different regulations involving 40 different
procedures between different administrative levels and causing lead times of 4 to 8 years.").
230 Ragwitz & Huber, supra note 225, at 13.
231

Id.

232

See id.

233

Id. at 1506; see id. at 1508.
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electricity. 23 4 However, in contrast to other technologies, PV producers with
less than 100 kW could not choose to sell on the free market under the 2004
decree.235
Finally, the 2004 decree continued to reduce the tariffs for other
technologies, such as wind, which had grown quickly, in part by building tariff
degression into the fixed rate structure. For example, five years after a plant
was commissioned, the tariff for a wind facility would drop to 85% of the
initial tariff under the 2004 decree.236 The decree scheduled most tariff
degression to occur at specified dates of 5, 15, 20, or 25 years from the date of
commissioning-dates, notably, that were tied simply to time, not to
technology cost reductions. To encourage the use of market-based tariffs,
however, the decree anticipated that most market premiums could remain fixed
throughout the "useful life of the plant." 2 37
5.

Royal Decree 661/2007

The 2004 reforms were generally considered successful at improving
Spain's FIT. However, only three years later, it became apparent that further
action was necessary to address three emerging problems: (1) threatened
security of the electric supply, (2) spiraling system costs, and (3) fewer
renewable producers choosing the market premium option than policymakers
preferred. 2 3 Thus, in 2007, after more than a year of negotiations, Spain
adopted Royal Decree 661/2007.239 This decree made several key changes to
the FIT.

234
Id. at 14-15. Formerly, only PV installations with less than 5 kW qualified for the highest
tariff rate. The published electricity price was determined as a "fixed percentage of the average
electricity tariff published at the end of each year, and which apply to the following year." Id. at
14.
235
Id. at 14-15.
236
id
237
Id The 2004 amendments also sought to address complaints that grid connection remained
a major obstacle for renewables generators, both in terms of lead time and connection costs,
despite being legally mandated by the 1997 decree. Subsequently, in 2011, Spain again sought to
streamline grid connection for renewables. See PAOLO MICHELE SONVILLA ET AL., INTEGRATION

OF ELECTRICITY FROM RENEWABLES TO THE ELECTRICITY GRID AND TO THE ELECTRICITY

MARKET-RES-INTEGRATION
(Mar.
14,
2012),
available
at
http://www.eclareon.euL/sites/default/files/spain_-resintegrationnationalstudynreap.pdf.
238
GonzAlez, supranote 193, at 2926.
239
Real Decreto 661/2007, de 25 de mayo, por el que se regula la actividad de producci6n de
energia eldctrica en r6gimen especial [Law Regulating the Activity of Electricity Production
Under
the
Special
Regime]
(B.O.E.
2007,
10556),
available
at
http://www.cne.es/cne/doc/legislacion/RD_661-2007-RE.pdf.
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First, the 2007 decree targeted grid security by limiting capacity
guarantee payments to fluctuating technologies like wind and PV. It also
increased regulation of deviations and penalties, applying a 5% tolerance limit
for deviations to all technologies.24 0
Second, the 2007 decree set cap and floor prices for renewable
producers participating in the market.24 1 If the market price plus the renewable
premium was above the cap, producers received only the cap. However, if the
market price fell below the floor, the floor price was paid. The idea was to
reduce windfall profits while preserving investor certainty.2 42
Third, the 2007 decree set an extremely generous PV rate: 58
Ecents/kWh, the most generous rate anywhere in the world at the time.243 Given
this rate, the decree also anticipated that a new royal decree would be adopted
once 85% of the PV target was reached. 244 The aim of this mandate for a
replacement decree was to reduce eventual PV payouts. In fact, however, the
risk of a new decree had the effect of reducing investor certainty for future PV
installs, thus spurring a rush to install new panels during the generous rate
period.24 5
Fourth, the 2007 decree extended the price cap to the market premium
option.246 This in turn made market participation less profitable than opting for
a fixed tariff, which was tied to inflation and guaranteed for forty years.247
Consequently, the high long-term fixed tariff rate and decreasing solar panel
costs enticed renewable investors to flood Spain's PV market.
Despite the 2007 decree's cost-controlling efforts, the Spanish
electricity sector incurred huge debt at the same time Spain was hit by the
global recession. Though the economic crisis went far beyond renewable
energy tariffs, the FIT quickly became a fiscal target as an avoidable expense in
a time of government austerity.248

240
241
242

Id
Gonzilez, supra note 193, at 2926.
Id.

Elisabeth Rosenthal, Solar Industry Learns Lessons in Spanish Sun, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,
2010, at Al.
244
Del Rio & Mir-Artigues, supra note 6. The resulting booming PV industry of 2008 is well
documented. See id.
245
Rio & Mir-Artigues, supra note 6, at 5559.
246
del Rio GonzAlez, supra note 193, at 2926.
243

247

Id

248

Id.
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Royal Decree 1578/2008

The 2007 decree had such an immediate impact on PV installations that
by 2008, Spain had already surpassed its 2010 PV goals. 24 9 But developers'
rush to cash in on Spain's generous fixed PV rate led quickly to ill effects,
including overinvestment, mounting FIT costs, and windfall profits as panel
costs fell. To counteract this, the 2008 decree made downward adjustments to
PV rates for installations made after September 29, 2008. The new rates
differentiated based on ground-based, building-integrated, and small rooftop
panels, and were most favorable for the latter. An eligibility cap applied to
each type of installation. These changes to the FIT regime sought to halt the
booming growth in PV, although they also reduced investor certainty.
7.

Royal Decrees 1565/2010, 1578/2010, and 14/2010

By 2010, Spain was reeling from both the global recession and the PV
sector's faster-than-expected growth. Thus, 2010 reforms to the FIT introduced
strong measures to pull back on the regime's aggressiveness.25 1 Quickly, these
changes drew criticism and, eventually, litigation for retroactivity and the
unsettling of legitimate expectations.252
Royal Decree 1565/2010 limited the 2007 tariff rates to the first
twenty-five years of facility operation, rather than the initially guaranteed
duration, which was often forty years. The 2010 decrees further reduced the PV
tariff rate from 2008 levels. Finally, they capped the amount of PV hours
eligible for payment, substantially shrinking the potential Spanish PV
market.253

Rosenthal, supra note 243.
See Rachel A. Nathanson, The Revocation of Clean-EnergyInvestment Economic-Support
Systems as Indirect ExpropriationPost-Nykomb: A Spanish Case Analysis, 98 IOWA L. REV.
863, 895-96 (2013).
251
Toby D. Couture, FITs and Stops: Spain's New Renewable Energy Plot Twist & What it
All Means, E3 ANALYTiCS, (Mar. 2012), at 6, available at http://www.e3analytics.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/AnalyticalBrief Vol4_1ssuel.pdf
252
Id.; High Court Case Law on Royal Decree 1565/2010, OSBORNE CLARKE (Apr. 16, 2012),
http://www.osbomeclarke.com/connected-insights/publications/high-court-case-law-on-royaldecree-15652010/.
253 See Solar Panel Installation in Spain, ENERGY KOREA (June 4, 2012),
http://energy.korea.com/archives/28981. In addition, the 2010 law removed the premium
payment option for wind power and solar thermal power for installations over 50 MW. Id.
249

250
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Obviously, each of these steps undercut generators' expectations and
profit projections.25 4 Thus, many observers were critical of the 2010 changes,
arguing that they undermined Spain's ability to attract investors. The European
Commission, in particular, criticized Spain's shifting policy as a threat to
foreign investments throughout the European Union.2 5 Nevertheless, Spain
was not done reforming its FIT.
8.

Stepping Back From the FIT: 2012 and 2013

Spain's 2008 and 2010 FIT revisions were widely seen as dramatic
steps to scale back what had proven to be an effective-but arguably fiscally
unsustainable-energy policy. The reasons for these changes were manifold,
but arguably foremost was the rising tariff deficit. Retail electricity rates,
tightly controlled by the government, did not cover the prices utilities paid
under the FIT. As a result, the system accumulated a "tariff debt" of £26
billion.256 Though this debt was initially accrued as private debt by utilities, the
government had backed the debt in 2009, essentially assuming liability for the
FIT regime's cost. 25 7 As the tariff debt gained a greater spotlight during the
economic crisis, the Spanish government targeted the FIT for further cuts, even
though the true underlying regulatory problem was the inability to charge
consumers the full cost of electricity. Thus, renewable energy industry, which
was "[o]nce touted as the embodiment of progress, wealth and sustainability,"
began to be seen in Spain "as an unwanted and costly extravagance. 2 58 The
ensuing FIT reform was not just abrupt but swift.
In 2012, the Spanish government froze new renewable energy
investments and removed producers' choice of tariff payment method, forcing
developers to use the market price. 2 5 9 These measures saved the government

Courts later determined, however, that these cuts, though promised in the past, were not
illegally retroactive since the support reduction's impact was in the future. High Court Case Law
on Royal Decree 1565/2010, supra note 252.
255
Solar PanelInstallationin Spain, supranote 253.
256 Blanca Diaz, Spain Abolishes FITs Entirely, PV MAG. (July 15, 2013), available at
http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/spain-abolishes-fitsentirely 100012050/#axzz2eWmHu981; Summary of the Reform of the Electricity System in
Spain and Financingof the Tariff Deficit, MNISTERIO DE INDUSTRIA, ENERGIA Y TURISM (July
at
available
2013),
http://www.thespanisheconomy.com/stfls/tse/ficheros/2013/agosto/PowerSystem-Reform.pdf.
257
Couture, supra note 251.
258
Cala,supra note 10.
259
Diaz, supra note 256.
254
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approximately £750 million, 26 0 but as would soon be seen, this was not the end
of the government's changes to its tariff.
The following year, the government announced financial stability
mechanisms throughout the energy sector, with a special emphasis on
renewable subsidies. The idea was to begin generating surpluses to cover the
cumulated debt and to prevent future utility deficit.2 61 The government
determined that the 2013 deficit would be shared between "the state budget
(C900 million), higher prices for consumers (£900 million), and utilities and
renewables electricity generators though lower remuneration (£2.7 billion)."26 2
The new FIT payment arrangement, announced in July 2013, will
directly lower compensation for renewables. The reform's final details have not
been announced, but it is already clear that the scheme's general contours will
differ from the former FIT in several ways.
First, renewable generators' guaranteed profits will no longer be tied to
the market premium or fixed FIT rates; gone are the days of per-kilowatt-hour
payments. Instead, each company's assets will be estimated, and those
estimates will be used to determine a "reasonable profitability"-using a
formula seeking to provide a 7.5% return on investment-that will be relied on
to establish the next six years' payments.263 Moreover, the renewable ener
compensation system is likely to be more market-oriented going forward.
Any continuing subsidies will consider both (1) plants' operational lifetime,
and (2) what subsidies they have already received.
Second, the reforms will apply retroactively, 265 which means that older
plants that have already received FIT payments may soon stop receiving

260

See id
Id
262 STANDARD & POOR'S, CREDIT FAQ: How SPAIN'S LATEST ELECTRICITY REFORMS WILL
2
(2013),
available
at
UTILITIES'
RATING
HEADROOM
FURTHER
ERODE
http://twitdoc.com/uploadlisa-nugent/2013-08-15-sp-creditfaq-how-spain-s-latest-electricityreforms-will-further-erode-utilities-rating-headroom.pdf.
263
Diaz, supra note 256; Alex Morales, FurtherSpanish Energy Reform Could Mean "Nasty
(July
15,
2013),
Cut"
for
Renewables,
BLOOMBERG
Revenue
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2013/07/spain-says-energy-reform-tocost-companies-2-7-billion; Suzanne Daley, Spain's Solar Pullback Threatens Pocketbooks, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2014, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/06/world/
europe/spains-solar-pullback-threatens-pocketbooks.html?pagewanted=all&r=O (noting that this
transition hurts investors who "paid more for their equipment, took out big loans or are paying
high interest rates").
264
See Cala, supra note 10.
265
The
Cost
Del
Sol,
ECONOMIST
(July
20,
2013),
available
at
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21582018-sustainable-energy-meets-unsustainablecosts-cost-del-sol; see also William Pentland, No End in Sight for Spain's Escalating Solar
2013,
2:28
PM),
(Aug.
16,
Crisis,
FORBES
261

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss3/8

42

Davies and Allen: Feed-In Tarrifs in Turmoil
2014]

FEED-INTARIFFS IN TURMOIL

979

subsidies altogether.266 This is critical because it unsettles market expectations
in yet another way, as some facilities will not receive a FIT at all. Indeed,
similar to the legal outcry following the 2010 Royal Decree, the 2013
announcement has already spurred legal challenges as to the constitutionality of
its retroactive application. 267
Third, FIT payments will be subject to automatic adjustments going
forward. The aim of this change is to prevent growth of the tariff deficit. 2 68
Thus, as 2013 came to a close, the Spanish FIT had in many ways
become the epitome of the turmoil these laws can create. Until the specifics of
the 2013 reforms are released, investors can only speculate about the ultimate
impact of Spain's new policy. However, the need for this kind of speculation at
all is the very antithesis of the core attribute for which FITs long have been
praised: the market certainty they can create.
B.

Effects of the Spanish FIT: Massive Deployment, High Costs

For proponents of renewable energy, there can be no doubt that the
Spanish FIT was for many years a success. Despite repeated changes to the
system over the last two decades, the Spanish FIT has made the country a
global leader in renewables deployment. In 1990, Spain produced less than 1%
of its electricity from renewables, and that 1% was almost exclusively from
hydro. 26 9 By 2009, renewables accounted for 24.7% of Spain's gross electricity
production and included a diverse portfolio of wind, solar, biomass, and
hydroelectric sources. 2 70 By April 2013, that figure was even higher: 54% of
total electricity production.27 1

http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2013/08/16/no-end-in-sight-for-spains-escalatingsolar-crisis/; Spanish CSP Sector Asks Europe to Start ProceedingsAgainst Spain, CSP WORLD
(June
18,
2013,
11:45
AM)
[hereinafter
Proceedings],
http://www.cspworld.com/news/20130618/001088/spanish-csp-sector-asks-europe-start-proceedings-againstspain.
266
11an Brat, Spain Prepares Cuts in Renewable-Energy Subsidies, WALL ST. J. (July 11,
2013,
9:48 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873248795045786
00500367507418.
267
The Cost Del Sol, supra note 265; see also Pentland, supra note 265. The Spanish CSP
association, Protermosolar, has already asked the European Commission to begin proceedings
against Spain for violating principles of, among other things, "legitimate expectations."
Proceedings,supra note 265.
268
Cala, supra note 258; The Cost Del Sol, supra note 265.
269
del Rio Gonzalez, supra note 193, at 2918.
270

MINISTERIO DE INDUSTRIA, TURISMO Y COMERCIO, SPAIN'S NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY
ACTION PLAN 2011-2020 17, (June 30, 2010). According to Eurostat, Spain's percentage of gross

electricity consumption from renewable sources went from 18.7% in 2004 to 31.5% in 2011.
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Renewable
Sources,
EUROSTAT,
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The PV market is a strong example of the Spanish FIT's success at
incentivizing renewables.272 In the late 1990s, Spain had approximately 2 MW
of installed solar PV.2 73 By 2009, the country had 3,317 MW of installed
capacity.274 Two years later, PV capacity had grown to 4,047 MW, with PV
production accounting for 4% of the nation's total electricity demand.275 This
was substantially above the official PV target, which initially was 400 MW for
2010.276 This extreme growth came in direct response to the FIT, and helped
produce a faster-than-predicted reduction in the technology's cost. 277
The Spanish FIT's success, however, was not limited to PV. It also
dramatically changed onshore wind capacity. With an initially strong tariff rate,
wind grew from less than 90 MW in 1993,278 to 114 MW in 1995,279 and to
over 2,800 MW in 2000.280 At the end of 2012, Spain remained second only to
Germany in installed wind in Europe, with 22,796 MW, and in 2013, Spain
became the first nation in the world to supply more of its electricity demand
with wind than any other generation source. 281 Likewise, the Concentrated
Solar Power ("CSP") industry grew rapidly after the CSP tariff was increased

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init-1&language=en&pcode=tsdcc330
&plugin=1 (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
271
Peter Kelly-Detwiler, Renewable Energy in Spain: The Good, And the Downright Ugly,
FORBES (May 8, 2013, 10:16 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterdetwiler/2013/05/08/
renewable- energy-in-spain-the-good-and-the-downright-ugly/.
272
See Rio & Gual, supra note 215, at 1010-11.
273
JACOBS, supra note 20, at 175.
274
Alasdair Cameron, Spanish PV After the Crash, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM
(Apr. 29,
2010),
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2010/04/spanish-pv-after-thecrash.
275
Maria Paz Espinosa, Understanding TariffDeficit and Its Challenges, 2 SPANISH EcoN. &
FIN. OUTLOOK 1, 5 (2013).
276
id,
277
id,
278

279

Time Britain Got the Wind Up, TiMEs (London), Sept. 5, 1991.
J.P.M. SuM, ENERGY RESEARCH CTR. OF THE NETH., THE PERFORMANCE OF FEED-IN TARIFFS

TO PROMOTE RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 12 (2002).
280
Id; Time Britain Got the Wind Up, TIMES (London), Sept. 5, 1991.
281 EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY Ass'N, WIND INPOWER: 2012 EUROPEAN STATISTICS 4 (2013),
at
available
http://www.ewea.org/fileadmin/files/library/publications/statistics/Wind_in powerannualstatis
tics_2012.pdf; Spain Breezes Into the Record Books as Wind Power Becomes Main Source of
PAIS
(Jan.
15,
2014),
http://elpais.com/elpais/2014/01/15/inenglish/
Energy, EL
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in 2007. Before the FIT, Spain had only negligible amounts of installed CSP.
By the end of 2012, it had 1,781 MW of installed capacity.282
Despite the Spanish FIT's success at deploying renewables, the
economic costs of achieving this success exposed a darker side of the system.
At least two major economic problems arose around Spain's FIT: the tariff
deficit and the boom-bust cycle for particular technologies.
The tariff deficit arose in large part because regulated consumer prices
were held low even as tariff costs increased.283 While Spanish retail electricity
prices were supposed to include "incentives for renewable energy and domestic
coal," in practice the government limited retail rates to prices well below the
amounts paid under the FIT.284 Indeed, from 2002 until 2006, electricity prices
were not permitted to grow by more than 2% annually. 285 Thus, because the
tariff deficit was calculated as the difference between utilities' FIT payments to
producers and the amount recouped by utilities from customers, the tariff
deficit quickly became an easy target for opponents of the FIT regime.
Spain's ever-increasing tariff deficit was supposed to be solved by
gradual rate increases for consumers and by selling the utilities' deficit as
securitized debt.286 With the financial crisis of 2008, however, debt buyers
became scarce, consumer demand for electricity dropped, and, politically, the
government could not raise consumer rates.287 Accordingly, in 2009, the
Spanish government guaranteed the utilities' securitized debts.288 This, the rush
of developers into the PV market post-2007, and uncertainty about the
renewable energy market's sustainability combined to create immense pressure
to change the FIT.289
Moreover, the Spanish FIT resulted in a cycle of booms and busts for
renewable technologies. These cycles, in turn, spurred rapid policy changes in
the FIT itself, which in turn reduced investor certainty. 29 Initial generous
tariffs incentivized fast, booming installations, particularly for PV and wind,
282
Herman K. Trabish, CSP 2012: Concentrated Solar Power Review, GREENTECH MEDIA
(Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/CSP-2012-Concentrated-SolarPower-Review-2012.
283 See generally Espinosa, supra note 275.
284
Id. at 2; see also Toby D. Couture, Guest Post: Spain's Renewable Energy Odyssey,
GREENTECH MEDIA (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/spainsrenewable-energy-odyssey (criticizing Spanish consumer price structures).
285 Mark Nolan, January Electricity Increase Set at 2.3%, LEADER (Dec. 27, 2013), available
at http://www.theleader.info/article/42060/.
286
id.
287
Id.
288
Couture, supra note 251.
289
Espinosa, supra note 275, at 2.
290
Couture, supra note 251.
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but the Spanish system did not include automatic degression, even when
installation targets were met. 2 9' The ensuing reaction was predictable. Locked
into overpaying for renewable energy production, the Spanish government
responded by decreasing FIT rates, capping eligible capacity, and instituting
rate degression. 292 The impacted technologies, which had gone through a boom
cycle from high tariffs, quickly turned to a bust cycle, with the government
lowering tariffs, demand for new installations slackening, and renewable
companies often unable to adjust quickly enough. 293 This boom-bust spiral sent
FIT policy into a further chain of changes, undermining the very certainty for
which FITs are praised.
The PV market epitomized this interrelationship between technology
and policy change. In 2007, Spain set what was, in retrospect, a clearly too high
PV tariff: 44 Ecents/kWh.29 4 Within the year, over 350 MW of new PV was
installed, and Spain quickly neared its 2010 target of 400 MW. 295 This boom
was fueled partly by the overly generous tariff and partly by the faster-thananticipated reduction in the price of Chinese solar panels, which flooded
Spain's market. The Spanish government quickly countered by capping solar
FIT eligibility, shortening contract periods, and reducing PV rates to
approximately 13 Ecents/kWh.296 Such measures were arguably necessary to
"control the market and thus the costs [of the tariff] for the final consumer." 297
But the measures had negative consequences on both the solar market and
overall investor confidence. Excess panels purchased before the tariff was
reduced overwhelmed the market, reducing their price even further. The
Spanish solar industry abandoned planned installations and lost approximately
20,000 employees.29 8 As the CEO of one of Spain's largest solar developers,
Santiago Seage noted, "What's important for the regulation of solar is
stability.. . . [U]p to now, we have had too many changes ... [and] if the
context changes, you can make mistakes in business decisions." 2 99

291
Paul Voosen, Spain's Solar Market Crash Offers a CautionaryTale About Feed-In Tariffs,
N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/08/18/18greenwire-spainssolar-market-crash-offers-a-cautionary-88308.html?pagewanted=all.
292
The Cost Del Sol, supra note 265.
293
Voosen, supra note 291.
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Voosen, supra note 291.
Id. (noting that rates were dropped by 30%).
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CurrentBarriersto the Spanish Feed-In Tariff System: Fundamental
Transition

C.

As 2014 dawned, the sun set on Spain's FIT. Predictably, the end of the
Spanish feed-in tariff has garnered substantial criticism from the renewable
energy industry. Industry representatives have "condemned the removal of
FITs, saying the decision was made without consultation and comes on the
back of previous cuts which have already reduced the profitability of...
installations by up to 40 per cent."30 0 In addition, consumers, subdivisions of
the Spanish government, and minority political parties30 have criticized the
reform. Particularly problematic is the retroactive application of the 2013
amendments, which has spurred legal action.302
The Spanish government, however, has urged that abandonment of the
FIT helps "plug a 26 billion euro ... electricity tariff deficit ... [and] is
necessary to guarantee the power system's financial stability."30 3 Spain's
industry minister, Jose Manuel Soria, has rejected claims that the 2013
electricity reforms were unconstitutional, and has suggested that under his
watch, any future tariff deficit "won't be the result of a gap in regulated costs
and revenues .... "

Thus, on the eve of what would have been the Spanish FIT's twentieth
anniversary, the law may have instead earned a eulogy. The Spanish FIT
deteriorated largely because consumer prices did not cover the support
scheme's costs, because adjustments made by the government did not match
the changing market (particularly in 2007), and because financing for any kind
of project became much scarcer. While the politics and design details of any
FIT are of course unique to the jurisdiction, inevitably nations worldwide will
look to the saga of Spain's FIT in deciding how to promote renewables at
home. In the wake of global economic recession, the Spanish government made
cuts across the board, and particularly to expenses as visible as electricity bills.
Unemployment skyrocketed to 26% in 2013, with prospects for 2014 looking

Diaz, supra note 256; Daley, supra note 263.
301
The 2013 reforms were introduced by the conservative party, which had a majority in
parliament. Tracy Rucinski, Spanish Court to Hear Cases Against Electricity Reform, REUTERS
http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/11/13/spain-energy-court2013),
13,
(Nov.
idINL5NOIY3J120131113.
302
Id. The European Photovoltaic Industry Association ("EPIA") and Spanish industry have
contended that the 2013 reform may violate E.U. directives. John Parnell, Spanish Solar Reforms
Could Break EU Laws, PV TECH (Nov. 13, 2013, 1:51 PM), http://www.pvtech.org/news/spanish-solarreformscouldbreakeu-laws.
303
Rucinski, supra note 301.
300
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no better.30 s Now, austerity reigns, both generally and for renewables. After
nearly two decades of heavy governmental incentives, Spain's official position
on renewable energy shifted dramatically: from longstanding support to
abandonment of a traditional FIT-in short, another story of feed-in tariffs in
turmoil.3 06
IV. SOUTH KOREA
A comparative latecomer to the game, South Korea implemented a FIT,
modeled on Germany's, 07 from 2002 until 2011. Initially, as was true in Spain,
South Korea's FIT had some success in jumpstarting specific renewable
technologies. In particular, wind and solar power grew quickly. However, in
2011, due in part to cost concerns, South Korea discontinued its FIT and
replaced it with a renewable portfolio standard ("RPS"). Unlike the fiscal crisis
in Spain, however, South Korea's step away from its FIT and toward an RPS
was as much deliberate policy choice as an outcome of financial and political
necessity. Indeed, the South Korean story adds yet another angle to the
narrative of feed-in tariffs in turmoil. While South Korea's abandonment of its
FIT shares a plotline with Spain's-particularly given South Korea's payment
for its tariff with government funds, and Spain's ultimate backing of utility debt
for its FIT's costs-the South Korean tale also highlights the importance of
policy goals for feed-in tariff longevity. The aim in Korea was to promote
domestic industry, and when the feed-in tariff instead benefitted foreign
companies, it quickly was in the crosshairs.
A.

The South Korean FIT: A Short-Lived Policy

A combination of factors motivated South Korea to implement a FIT in
2002. These centered mainly on hope for industry promotion and job creation,
Youth unemployment is even higher: 50%. An estimated 100,000 university graduates
have left Spain to seek employment in comparatively prosperous northern Europe. Liz Alderman,
Young and Educated in Europe, but Desperate for Jobs, N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/16/world/europe/youth-unemployement-in-europe.html?_r-0;
see also ORG. FOR EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ECONOMIC SURVEYS OF SPAIN 17 (2012),
available
at
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/economics/oecdeconomic-surveys-spain-2012_ecosurveys-esp-2012-en#page 19.
306
In addition to altering the FIT, Spain's parliament is expected to pass a measure that will
place a fee on individuals who produce renewable power for personal use. Anna Pdrez & Ilan
Brat, Spaniards Gird for Solar-Power Fee, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2013, 8:59 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052702304626104579121823944695940.
307
Jane Burgermeister, South Korea Taps Germany to Help Grow Its Solar Industry,
29,
2009),
(Apr.
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2009/04/south-korea-looks-to-germanyto-help-grow-its-solar-industry.
305
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energy security, and some concern for environmental protection. In short, the
background factors driving South Korea's adoption of a FIT were broadly
similar to those in Germany and Spain. The ultimate policy outcome in South
Korea, however, was substantially different for several reasons. First, the
government viewed the FIT as a heavy financial burden because it was drawn
directly out of the state budget. Second, domestic renewable industry growth
did not develop as successfully as anticipated. Rather, imported equipment
made up the majority of South Korea's renewable installations during its FIT
regime.
Thus, over the life of its FIT, South Korea gradually increased
capacity caps for specific renewable technologies while also continuously
implementing cost control measures by decreasing FIT rates. 309 Then, less than
a decade after adopting it, South Korea abdicated its feed-in tariff altogether.
Renewables fell into favor in South Korea at the end of the twentieth
century in part because of their positive environmental attributes but even more
so for their potential to drive economic growth. Energy security long has been
an important concern in South Korea because of the nation's heavy dependence
on imported fuels, including in its electricity sector. 310 Nevertheless, beginning
in the 1960s, South Korea experienced meteoric economic growth, quickly
developing into an industrial, export-oriented economy.311 During this period of
fast-paced growth, electricity needs doubled every eight to ten years,3 12 and
imported energy powered the transformation: In 2000, energy imports
(including nuclear) accounted for 97.6% of South Korea's energy supply. 3 13
This dependence on energy imports became particularly problematic for South
Korea after the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997, which significantly devalued the

308
Choi Woo-jung, Solar Energy Second Only to Biofuel, KOREA TIMEs (July 29, 2007),
http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2007/07/602_7372.html.
309 INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY POLICIES OF lEA COUNTRIES 75 (2006).
310 John Byrne et al., Electricity Reform at a Crossroads: Problems in South Korea's Power
LiberalizationStrategy, 77 PACIFIC AFF. 496 (2004). South Korea does possess some anthracite
coal and natural gas. STEPHEN WEBB, DLA PIPER, RENEWABLE ENERGY INTHE ASIA PACIFIC: A
LEGAL
OVERVIEW
(3d
ed.
2013),
available
at
http://www.dlapiper.com/files/Publication/03fb4l0e-3881-448c-b9034a5a8ded836c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/39bl2ffb-6cl2-4fc8-a201 9183b32c612c/RenewableEnergyinAsia Pacific_3rdEdition.pdf.
311

See KENT E. CALDER, KOR. ECON. INST., KOREA'S ENERGY INSECURITIES: COMPARATIVE

AND
REGIONAL
PERSPECTIVES
7
(2005),
available
at
http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/05Calder.pdf.; see also Byrne et al., supra
note 310, at 496-97.
312
See id.
313
Hoseok Kim et al., Energy Demand and Supply, Energy Policies, and Energy Security in
the Republic ofKorea, 39 ENERGY POL'Y 6882, 6883 (2011).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2014

49

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 116, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 8
986

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116

South Korean won ("KRW"), 3 14 cutting national purchasing power in half and
driving the economy into tailspin.3 1 s
In light of these conditions, South Korea began to see renewables both
as a possible solution to its energy security concerns and as an opportunity to
create a new export commodity. Under a banner that would later become
known as "green growth"-economic development "through green technology
innovations"-South Korea embraced renewable policy as an important tool
for improving the country's socioeconomic outlook.3 16 Thus, green technology,
developed and used at home, was seen as a pathway to get South Korea's foot
in the door of the global renewable energy market.3 17
Meanwhile, environmental policy and consciousness in South Korea
also began to rise, particularly following the advent of South Korean
democracy in 1987.
Social advocates began to "vigorously" push
environmental and other concerns to shape national legislation, and by the late
1980s, civic groups grew substantially.3 19 Concers over air pollution, climate
change, and opposition to nuclear power entered the national discussion.320
South Korea became a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change and ratified the Kyoto Protocol.32 1 In 1998, South Korea

314
As of March 6, 2014, one U.S. dollar was equal to 1,064.84 Korean won. Currency
Converter, XE, http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
315 Byrne et al., supra note 310, at 500; see also Ten Years On: How Asia Shrugged
off Its

Economic
Crisis,
ECONOMIST
http://www.economist.com/node/9432495.

(July

4,

2007),

available

at

3
Id.; Sang In Kang et al., Korea's Low-Carbon Green Growth Strategy 7 (Org. for Econ.
Cooperation & Dev., Working Paper No. 310, 2012), available at http://www.oecdilibrary.org/development/korea-s-low-carbon-green-growth-strategy_5k9cvqmvszbr-en;
Wind
Power on the Rise in South Korea, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (Jan. 15, 2007),
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2007/01/wind-power-on-the-rise-insouth-korea-47109; see also Jim Tankersley, Green Growth Advocate Hopesfor Bigger Changes
from
the
Copenhagen
Conference,
L.A.
TIMEs
(Dec.
9.
2009),
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/09/world/la-fg-global-climate9-2009decO9.
317 It's Time for Korea to Plumb for Renewable Energy,
CHOSUNILBO (Mar. 12, 2007),
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/htm dir/2007/03/12/2007031261015.html.
318
Byme et al., supra note 310, at 507.
9 Id. at 500, 507.
320
CALDER, supra note 311, at 8. For example, in 1990, farmers on the island of Anmyeon
violently protested against a planned nuclear waste storage facility. Park Seong-won et al., The
Domestic and InternationalPolitics of Spent NuclearFuel in South Korea: Are We Approaching
Meltdown?, KOR. ECON. INST., 1, 2 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.nautilus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/10021 KEI.pdf.

321

Republic

of

Korea,

UN

FRAMEwORK

CONVENTION

http://maindb.unfccc.int/public/country.pl?country-KR

ON

CLIMATE

CHANGE,

(last visited Mar. 6, 2014); ORG. FOR

EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV., KOREA-REGULATORY REFORM INELECTRICITY 21 (2000), available

at http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/2497412.pdf.
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formed a response committee to establish policy goals for greenhouse gas
mitigation.322 While that policy grew to include a wide variety of features,
including internal energy audits and certification for high efficiency equipment
and cars, the promotion of renewable energy quickly became one of its core
attributes. 3 2 3 "To prepare for the Kyoto Protocol system, the Ministry of
Commerce, Industry and Energy is trying to raise the portion of renewable
energy in Korea's total power supply by offering subsidies." 324 In fact, since at
least 1994, Korea provided government subsidies for renewables.3 25
Together, all this set the stage for a South Korean FIT. Indeed, that step
came less than five years after Kyoto.
1.

Implementing Fixed Prices

The first steps to South Korea's FIT came as part of its effort to
promote economic development through clean energy in 2002 and 2003. In
those years, South Korea's Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy set the
first standard prices for renewable energy.326 The Ministry of Commerce,
Industry, and Energy implemented the FIT policy by relying on two legal
documents. First, the government amended the Act on the Promotion of the
Development, Use and Diffusion of New and Renewable Energy 327 (the "South
Korean Act"), which became the legal framework for the FIT.328 The
government originally passed the South Korean Act, without the FIT provision,
obligations under international treaties; however, it has voluntarily set conservation and
efficiency goals throughout its energy sector. See generally id; UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status-of ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
322

INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY POLICIES OF IEA COUNTRIES: REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 51

(2006), availableat http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/korea2006.pdf.
323
See id at 50.
324
Wind Power on the Rise in South Korea,supra note 316.
325
Amin Shokri & Eunnyeong Heo, Energy Policies to Promote Renewable Energy
Countries Experiences 3, available at
Technologies; Learning from Asian
http://eneken.ieej.orjp/3rdIAEE Asialpdf/paper/1 10p.pdf.
326 Act on the Promotion of the Development, Use and Diffusion of New and Renewable
Energy, Act. No. 7284, Dec. 31, 2004, art. 17, amended by Act. No. 10253, Apr. 12, 2010 (S.
Kor.). See generally Korean Energy Management Corporation, Programfor Promoting NRE
Utilization:Feed-In-Tarifs,http://www.kemco.or.kr/new eng/pg02/pg02040700.asp (last visited
Mar. 8, 2014). The Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy was responsible for energy
policy in Korea. This agency was reorganized into the Ministry of Knowledge Economy
("MKE") in 2008, and finally into the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy in 2013.
327
Act on the Promotion of the Development, Use and Diffusion of New and Renewable
Energy, Act. No. 7284, Dec. 31, 2004, art. 17, amended by Act. No. 10253, Apr. 12, 2010 (S.
Kor.).
328

ENERGY POLICIES OF IEA COUNTRIES: REPUBLIC OF KOREA, supra note 322, at 12.
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in 1987. The South Korean Act's original purpose was to provide funding for
research and development into renewable energies.329 By 2002, however, it
expanded to include a provision implementing the FIT. Second, in 2003, the
Second Basic Plan for National Energy (the "Plan") 330 established ambitious
renewable energy targets for South Korea. Specifically, the Plan created an
overall goal of 3% of total primary energy supply from renewables by 2006 and
5% by 201 1. 31
The details of the South Korean FIT resembled policies used in other
countries, although the law also had to operate within a highly consolidated
electricity system. Specifically, under the FIT, the Ministry of Commerce,
Industry, and Energy set a rate for each renewable technology pursuant to the
South Korean Act. Similar to FIT regulations in Spain and Germany, the South
Korean Act defined renewable energy as a variety of different technologies
including photovoltaic, wind, hydro, tidal, biofuel, waste, and fuel cells. 3 32
Rates aimed to compensate companies for the additional costs of renewable
power generation over conventional electricity.33 3 Tariffs were adjusted
annually.
After the government set the rate, the Korea Energy Management
Corporation ("KEMCO"), 334 working in conjunction with Korea Electric Power
Corporation ("KEPCO")-which owns essentially all aspects of South Korea's
electricity system, including the nation's major electricity generation 335

329

HYAN JEAN LEE & SUNG-WON YooN, RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY IN GERMANY AND ITS

IMPLICATIONS FOR KOREA 87-88 (2010).
330
ENERGY POLICIES OF IEA COUNTRIES: REPUBLIC OF KOREA, supra note 322, at 12, 71. Basic

plans and national energy plans were passed in subsequent years with similar names. Most
recently, the Second Basic National Energy Plan was announced in January 2014, setting a goal
of 11% renewable energy by 2035. Heesu Lee, South Korea Targets 29 Percent Nuclear Power
Reliance by 2035, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-1210/south-korea-targets-29-percent-nuclear-power-reliance-by-2035.html.
331
Id These goals were reduced in subsequent energy plans. Id.
332
Act on the Promotion of the Development, Use and Diffusion of New and Renewable
Energy, Act. No. 7284, Dec. 31, 2004, art. 17, amended by Act. No. 10253, Apr. 12, 2010 (S.
Kor.).
3
The International CHP/DHC Collaborative, CHP/DHC Country Scorecard: Republic of
Korea, http://www.iea.org/medialfiles/chp/profiles/Korea.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2014); see also
Dokjeom gyuje mit gongjeong geooraeae gwanhanbeobyul sihaengryung [Enforcement Decree
of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act], Presidential Decree No. 19023, Aug. 31, 2005,
as amended (S. Kor.).
334
The Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy (later MKE) imposed the task of
implementing the FIT and meeting national renewable energy targets on KEMCO and its
affiliate, the New and Renewable Energy Center.
335
KEPCO is a state-owned company that, since 1961, has dominated all aspects of the
Korean electricity sector, including generation, distribution, and transmission. Efforts in the early
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implemented the FIT. KEMCO assessed how to apply the FIT to KEPCO's
renewable electricity generators. Since KEPCO sets standard prices for
traditional electricity and is the main buyer from the centralized electricity
pool, KEMCO and KEPCO both influenced the prices paid to renewable
generators. 336
Specifically, by the terms of the South Korean Act, KEPCO would
purchase electricity from renewable sources for a fixed, FIT price. The
government would then compensate KEPCO out of the state budget for the
difference between the cost of renewable electricity and the cost of electricity
powered by fossil fuels.3 37 As in Germany and Spain, purchase of renewable
electricity was mandatory, as was a grid connection for such producers.
Initially, most renewable generators could choose between a fixed
(often below market price) or a variable FIT (approximately 5-20 KRW above
wholesale market price).3 38 If a generation project received more than 30% of
costs from other government grants or subsidies, it was not eligible for the
FIT.339
The government guaranteed a fixed tariff of five years for small
hydropower, biomass, and waste, and fifteen to twenty years for wind and
PV. 34 0 The government set an initial upper limit of support for solar and wind at
20 MW and 250 MW, respectively, on a first-come, first-serve basis. 34 1 Later,
the government modified these caps to 50 MW for 2009, 70 MW for 2010, and
80 MW for 201 1.342 The modification of these caps demonstrates how South
Korea, like Spain and Germany, continuously monitored and altered aspects of
its FIT in an effort to control program costs.

2000s to unbundle and privatize KEPCO's generation facilities were largely unsuccessful;
independent producers owned only 13% of generation capacity in 2009. KEPCO continues to
wholly own or own majority shares in all other aspects of the electricity sector. ORG. FOR EcoN.
CO-OPERATION & DEV., KOREA-REGULATORY REFORM IN ELECTRICITY, supra note 321, at 11. The
few independent generators that were permitted in the 1990s could only sell their power to
KEPCO. Id. at 11, 24; see also AUSTRALIAN PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, SOUTH KOREA'S
ELECTRICITY
GENERATION
SECTOR
2,
available
at
http://www.pc.gov.au/_data/assets/pdf file/0009/109926/18-carbon-prices-appendixi.pdf.
336
Several large industrial consumers may make contracts with electricity generators as
wholesale purchasers. Byrne et al., supra note 310, at 505.
337 Korean Energy Management Corporation, supra note 326.
338
3

AUSTRALIAN PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, supra note 335, at
7.
KPMG INT'L, TAXES AND INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY 37 (June 2012), available

at http://www.kpmg.at/uploads/media/Taxesincentives renewable_2012_02.pdf.
340

INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 322, at 75.

341

Id

342

KOREAN-GERMAN

CHAMBER

OF

COMMERCE

AND

INDUS.,

MARKET

STUDY:

GREEN

TECHNOLOGY INKOREA 11 (Sept. 2010) [hereinafter MARKET STUDY], availableat http://www.s-

ge.comlen/filefield-private/files/6561/field blogpublic_files/7928.
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Initially, the FIT gave PV and wind the most generous rates. PV
producers received 716.4 KRW/kWh and wind 107.6 KRW/kWh.3 43 By
contrast, small hydro and tidal power received 73.7 KRW/kWh and 62.81
KRW/kWh, respectively. 3 Rates were differentiated on the basis of generation
capacity, and in the case of PV, by ground-based or rooftop installations (and
by the contractual period guaranteed). FIT rates for new installations, in
general, progressively decreased from highs in 2002 to a low in 2011.345
Although PV received a generous rate as early as 2004, investors did
not fully embrace the solar FIT until 2006, when Korea saw 23 MW of PV
installed. The rate for PV in 2006 was 677.38 KRW/kWh for systems larger
than 30 kW, and 711.25 KRW/kWh for smaller systems.346 The growth of PV
installations continued in 2007 with 46.9 MW installed, and spiked in 2008
with over 280 MW of installed PV. 34 7 Rates remained favorable throughout
2008, and South Korea quickly became the nation with the fourth largest
number of solar panel installations in the world.348
Following this boom, in 2010 and 2011, the government decreased PV
tariff rates by 12% to 13% for ground-based systems and 6% to 7% for rooftop
installations. 349 By 2010, for example, ground-based PV installations smaller
than 30 kW received 514.34 KRW/kWh, and installations larger than 3 MW
received 370.7 KRW/kWh.so In 2011, the year before the government
eliminated the FIT, the same generation facilities received as little as 439.56
KRW/kWh and 316.8 KRW/kWh.3 5 1

343

INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 322, at 75.

Seong-Ho Lee, The Role of New and Renewable Energy Center (KEMCO) in the
Expansion of PV Market in Korea, PHOTOVOLTAIC SPECIALISTS CoNF., 2006 IEEE 4th, May
2006, at 14, available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=4059550.
345 See Sophie Avril et al., Solar Energy Support in the Asia-Pacific Region, PROGRESS IN
PHOTOVLOTAIcs 785, 792 (2012).
346
id.
34

347

Kyung Nam Kim et al., Korean Photovoltaic Industry and Technology: Now and Future,

PHOTOVOLTAIC

SPECIALISTS

CoNF.,

2011

IEEE

37th,

June

2011,

available at

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber-6185856. FIT rates for ground-based
PV with less than 30 kW and fifteen year contracts, for example, received a rate of 646.96 KRW.
Sophie Avril et al., supra note 345.
348 Ucilia Wang, Report: Korea's Solar Industry on the Rise, GREENTECHSOLAR (Mar. 6,
2009),
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/report-koreas-solar-industry-on-the-rise5840/.
34
Kyung Nam Kim et al., supra note 347.
350

id

351

id.
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Winding Down the FIT

Although the South Korean FIT had some success, it soon ran into
strong headwinds, caused in part by its own design flaws. First was cost. While
new 2008 South Korean President, Lee Myung-bak, continued to promote the
renewables industry "as a new economic growth engine" during the global
economic downturn of 2008,352 payment of FIT rates out of the state budget,
perhaps predictably, did not play well. This was especially true as the idea that
the FIT could deliver economic benefits began to show cracks. South Korea
adopted its FIT with the hope that it would spur economic growth domestically,
but as it turned out, it was foreign investment firms and foreign-made
equipment that reaped many of the program's benefits. Thus, contrary to the
government's intention of jumpstarting a domestic clean technology industry,
Korean tax funds shifted to the pockets of foreign companies, which,
understandably, quickly turned government officials against the costly
program.
As criticism of the Korean FIT mounted, it soon became apparent that
the regime would not last. While official statements remained positive on clean
technology, some began to criticize Korean green growth policies as putting
growth first and green second.354 Beginning in 2009, the government passed
regulations to reduce FIT rates for new installations: down to 400-560
KRW/kWh for solar and approximately 107 KRW/kWh for wind.355 These FIT
reduction measures were responsible for decreases in the amounts of new
installations, particularly in PV in 2009-2010.356 The government also
continuously modified capacity limits for specific technologies and, as early as
2006, began considering alternative renewable promotion strategies, such as an
RPS.357 By 2009, against the wishes of small renewable generators, the

352
Green Energy Gets Government Boost, CHOSUNILBO (Sept.
12,
2008),
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html-dir/2008/09/12/2008091261016.html.
3
Choi Woo-jung, Solar Energy Second Only to Biofuel, KOREA TIMEs (July 29, 2007),
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2010/09/123 7372.html.
354
Inhye Heo, The Political Economy ofPolicy Gridlock in South Korea: The Case of the Lee
Myung-bak Government's Green Growth Policy, 41 POLITICS & POLICY 509, 513-14 (2013); see
also, e.g., Renewable Energy Supplies to Increase, CHOSUNILBO (Aug. 28, 2008), available at
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html-dir/2008/08/28/2008082861015.html; Kim Yoo-chul,
HHI Muscles into Solar Power Generation Business, KOREA TIMES (Oct. 21, 2008),
http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2008/10/602_33081 .html.
355
MARKET STUDY, supra note 342, at 11.
356
Sophie Avril et al., supra note 345, at 793.
3
Id.; INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 322, at 76. In 2010, the government again modified
FIT support for PV by limiting eligibility to 70 MW per year, and in 2011 to 80 MW. MARKET
STUDY, supra note 342, at 11.
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government began phasing out FIT support,3 ss and in 2012, eliminated the FIT
altogether, replacing it with an RPS. South Korea thus followed in Spain's
tracks by repeatedly adjusting, and eventually abolishing, its FIT.
B.

Effects of South Korea's FIT

The South Korean FIT opened the door for investments in certain
technologies, namely PV and onshore wind. Overall, however, the FIT did not
substantially reduce South Korea's dependence on imports and nonrenewables.
Under its feed-in tariff, sales of renewable energy grew from 139.4 billion
KRW in South Korea in 2004 to 4,275 billion KRW in 2009.360 According to
KEMCO, "Annual total volume of PV dissemination,... [which received the
most generous FIT rate,] had been just over 200kW before 2004. However, as
the FIT system was announced and recognized by investors, PV installation
increased dramatically and reached about 497MW in 201 1."3' By 2008, South
Korea had installed over 228 MW of PV and possessed the fourth largest
amount of installed solar panels worldwide, behind only Spain, Germany, and
the United States.362
However, as happened in Spain and Germany, after the initial PV
boom, the government quickly adjusted the FIT, lowering the PV rate.
Correspondingly, the level of new installations fell, and South Korea installed
131 MW and 92 MW, respectively, in 2010 and 2011-down from 228 MW in
2008 and 170 MW in 2009.36
Wind technology likewise increased dramatically under the Korean
FIT. In 2003, South Korea had an installed capacit of 18.2 MW of wind
energy. 365 By 2008, that figure grew to 204.1 MW.36 However, concurrent
with the global economic downturn, the government decreased the wind FIT by
2% annually after 2008, and new installations fell from a peak of 108.02 MW

Korea to Invest W3 Trillion in Renewable Energy, CHOsUNILBO (July 10, 2009),

358

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/htmldir/2009/07/10/2009071000849.html.
359

Jonathan Gifford, Korea's Cautious Comeback, PV MAGAZINE (Mar. 2013), available at

http://www.pv-magazine.com/archive/articles/beitrag/koreas-cautious-comeback100010400/86/?tx ttnews%5BbackCat/o5D=215&cHash=77adbfl5f8bed8a9ab9617cedf0fl 1c.
3

MARKET STUDY, supra note 342, at 9.

361

Korean Energy Management Corporation, supra note 326.

362
363

Wang, supra note 348.
MARKET STUDY, supra note 342, at 10; Gifford, supra note 359.

3

Gifford, supra note 359.

365

MARKET STUDY, supra note 342, at 19.
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installed in 2008 to only 84 MW installed in 2009.3" Nevertheless, by 2011,
South Korea had more than 276 MW of wind power connected to the grid,
accounting for approximately 1%of the global wind market. 6 By September
2013, the country had accumulated 480 MW of onshore installed wind
capacity. 369
Indeed, not just PV and wind, but total electricity generation from
renewables grew while South Korea used a feed-in tariff. In 2003, renewable
energy accounted for just over 1% of primary energy consumption and less
than 0.5% of total electricity generation in South Korea.3 70 By 2010, those
tallies had increased to 2.6% and 1.24%, respectively.
In addition, the South Korean FIT did at least partially succeed at
promoting economic development. For instance, KEMCO reported a strong
increase in the number of companies active in the nation's renewable energy
sector, growing from 41 firms in 2004 to 212 in 2010.372 Included in those
companies were 91 PV firms, 46 bioenergy companies, and 30 wind firms. 373
Furthermore, KEMCO noted that the renewable energy workforce climbed
from 689 in 2004 to 17,348 in 2010. 374 Of these workers, 11,556 were
employed in the PV and wind power industries alone. 375 Of course, how much
of this growth is directly attributable to the FIT is less clear.
Despite this, the South Korean FIT did little to move the needle on the
country's overall energy mix. At the FIT's end in 2011, South Korea was the
fifth largest importer of oil and the second largest importer of liquefied natural
MARKET STUDY, supra note

342, at 19; Young II Choung, Ernst & Young, Quick Look:
Renewable Energy Development in South Korea, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (Dec. 28,
367

2010), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2010/12/quick-look-renewableenergy-development-in-south-korea.
368

See WEBB, supra note 310; Sarosh Bana, Market Report: South Korea and its Renewable
2013),
(Mar.
2,
RENEWABLEENERGYFOCUS.COM
Ambition,

Energy

http://www.renewableenergyfocus.com/view/31482/market-report-south-korea-and-itsrenewable-energy-ambition/.
369
WEBB, supra note 310.
370 KOREA ENERGY MANAGEMENT CoORATiON (KEMCO), OVERVIEW OF NEW AND
RENEWABLE ENERGY IN KOREA (2012) [hereinafter KEMCO]; ENERGY INFO. ADNMIN., ANNUAL
at
available
(2004),
325
at
2003,
REvIEW
ENERGY
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/archive/038403.pdf.
371
KEMCO, supra note 370, at 10.
372

Sarosh

Bana,

Factfile:

RPS

Framework

Drives

South

Korean

Market,

2013),
1,
(Apr.
http://www.renewableenergyfocus.com/view/31556/factfile-rps-framework-drives-south-koreanmarket/.
RENEWABLEENERGYFOCUS.COM

373

id

374

id.

375

id
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gas ("LNG") in the world.376 This represents little change from 2002 oil
imports and a 125% increase in LNG imports.Y Thus, even after the FIT,
South Korea continued to import 97% of its energy needs.37
Even more tellingly, the FIT's monetary cost was substantial.379 in
2004, after only two years of implementation, the FIT had cost the government
11.7 billion KRW, and officials were already anticipating a market-based
method to curtail growing costs. 38 0 The International Energy Agency thus
criticized South Korea's FIT as an expensive way of funding technology:
Korea's USD 0.70 per kWh feed-in tariff rate for solar
photovoltaics would provide a payment of USD [1,600]
annually per 2-kW panel, equivalent to a ten-year simple
payback time, a favourable rate considering that payments are
guaranteed for 15 years and the operational lifetime of a solar
panel is about 20 years. The government should consider more
market-based alternatives to feed-in tariffs .... 381
The government also noted other problems with the FIT, including strain on the
public fisc, the difficulty in setting realistic renewable energy targets, and the
risk of market imperfections, such as windfall profits or "excess" renewable
energy production not covered by the FIT because of program caps.382 As a
consequence, the government, though publicly continuing its quest for a "Low
Carbon, Green Growth" economy, determined that the FIT placed too much
obligation on the government and not enough on the market.383

316 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
SouTH KOREA (Jan 17, 2013), available at
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/SouthKorea/southkorea.pdf; Calder, supra note
311, at 5.
377 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 376.
378

Id.

Do-Yo Kim, Introduction ofRPS andPhase-OutofFIT in Renewable Energy Policy, INT'L
FIN. L. REv. (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.iflr.com/Article/3072471/lntroduction-of-RPS-andphase-out-of-FIT-in-renewable-energy-policy.html. The KEMCO body charged with maintaining
the FIT was given a budget of almost 4 billion KRW for FIT purposes. KEMCO, supra note 370,
at 5.
380
INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 322, at 76.
381
Id. at 78-79 (internal citations omitted).
382 Program for Promoting NRE Deployment, KOREAN ENERGY MGMT. CORP.,
http://www.kemco.or.kr/new-eng/pg02/pg02040705.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2014); see also
Burgermeister, supra note 307. While operating its FIT, South Korea also implemented other
renewable energy support measures, such as direct support, tax benefits, and research funding.
The lack of coordination among these schemes was criticized as inefficient and for creating path
dependency. INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 322, at 78.
383
Ali Almansoori, The Influence of South Korean Energy Policy on OPEC Oil Exports, 67
ENERGY POL'Y 572, 572 (2014).
3
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Replacing South Korea'sFIT

South Korea no longer operates a FIT. Although prior tariff rates will
continue to apply to existing facilities for their promised duration, usually
fifteen years, no new projects are eligible for the old regime. Instead, in 2012,
South Korea replaced its FIT with a renewable portfolio standard. 3 8 The RPS
385
It
applies only to power generators with a capacity of 500 MW or more.
imposes purchasing goals on generators, beginning at 2% renewables in 2012
and increasing by 0.5% until 2015, when it will rise by 1% per year until it
reaches 10% in 2022.386 Government subsidies, such as a 5% tax credit for
renewable equipment and investments in renewable research and development,
are also scheduled to continue. 3 87
Small renewable generators, which no longer receive the FIT, and the
largest producers, which must now find ways to comply with RPS mandates,
objected to the FIT's removal. Nevertheless, other energy players view the
switch to an RPS as a boon to their business. Under the RPS, a multiplier of
0.25 to 2 is assigned to each type of renewable technology, determining its
value under the law.388 Fuel cells, for example, are rated favorably as a 2 under
the new RPS. One executive of a fuel cell company lauded the decision to
remove the capped FIT system: "The Government initially encouraged .. . fuel
cells [using] a feed-in tariff.. . with an aggregate limit of 50 MW over the life
of the program. This new RPS program, with a goal for approximately 7,000
MW of new and renewable power by 2022, creates a substantially larger
market opportunity . . . ."389 Likewise, other technologies, such as solar,
continue to receive favored treatment under the RPS due to technology-specific
quotas that are carved out to promote development of particular renewable
technologies.390

3

TAXES AND INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 339.
Kim, supra note 379. This includes, initially, Korea District Heat Corporation, Korea
Water Resources Corporation, Posco Power, SK E&S, GS EPS, GS Power, and MPC Yulchon,
as well as six KEPCO subsidiaries. KEMCO, supra note 370, at 37.
385

386

Kim, supra note 379.

SOuTH KOREA, supranote 376.
Programfor PromotingNRE Deployment, supranote 382.
389 FuelCell Energy, Fuel Cells Earn Prominent Position Within South Korean Renewable
2011),
13,
(Jan.
GLOBENEWSWIRE
Portfolio Standard Pricing Mechanism,
http://globenewswire.com/news-release/2011/01/13/437763/211028/en/Fuel-Cells-EarnProminent-Position-Within-South-Korean-Renewable-Portfolio-Standard-PricingMechanism.html.
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South Korea's RPS seeks to resolve the economic problems that
motivated its transition away from a FIT. 1 Perhaps most significantly, the
RPS changed the practice of financing renewables out of the state budget and
instead now allows renewable energy costs to be passed to consumers and, in
the near term, renewable producers. In addition, because the RPS favors least
costly renewable technologies, it aims to diminish the overall price tag of
supporting renewables development. Finally, the Korean RPS seeks to smooth
out market growth for renewables. In contrast to the risk of FITs encouraging a
rush to market,393 such as the boom in PV from 45 MW in 2007 to 274 MW in
2008,394 the RPS's time-based percentage targets seek to encourage more even,
rather than boom-bust, renewables growth.
Given that it has only just begun to operate, it is too early for a verdict
on the Korean RPS's success, although it is clear that some new renewable
installations are continuing. At the start of 2014, for example, the largest fuel
cell park in the world, a 59 MW facility, became operational in South Korea,
and the country's new president, Park Geun Hye endorsed renewable energy as
a vehicle for economic development, rebooting an "era of green growth 2.0."
At the same time, some question the ability of the RPS to foment further
growth in renewables, raising questions of the shape of Korean policy in the
future. 396
Thus, as Germany continues to grapple with how to best manage its
FIT, and Spain seeks to find a new path for promoting renewable energy in the
Iberian Peninsula, the story of renewable energy development in South Korea
391 Kim, supra note 379.
392 Jihyo Kim et al., Renewable Electricity as a Differentiated Good? The Case of the
Republic of Korea, 54
ENERGY POL'Y 327,
329
(2013),
available at

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512010245 (noting, however, that
rises in traditionally low consumer electricity costs may become politically problematic).
3
KEMCO, supra note 370, at 34.
394 Wang, supra note 348.
39s Heather Clancy, Milestone Year for Fuel Cell Energy Installations, FORBES (Dec. 12,
2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/heatherclancy/2013/12/12/milestone-year-for-fuel-cellenergy-installations/; Pete Danko, Fuel Cells Power Up: Three Surprising Places Where
Hydrogen Energy Is Working, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (April 3, 2014), available at
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2014/04/140403-fuel-cells-hydrogen-wal-martstationary/. Previously, President Park had distanced herself from her predecessor's green growth
policies for political reasons. Shin Hyon-hee, Korea Eyes Era of 'Green Growth 2.0,' KOREA
at
2013,
available
Nov.
10,
HERALD,

http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20131110000342;

Sung-Young Kim & Elizabeth

Thurbon, Green Growth: Rebooted in South Korea, Booted out in Australia, CONVERSATION

(Feb. 6, 2014), http://theconversation.com/green-growth-rebooted-in-south-korea-booted-out-inaustralia-22243.
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also remains an ongoing one. The country's shift away from a FIT to an RPS is
one to watch, with the Korean experience potentially offering important lessons
for renewable energy support policy worldwide.
V. LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Often, especially by renewable energy advocates, feed-in tariffs are
portrayed as optimal policies that promote renewable energy in a way other
support mechanisms cannot. As the experiences in Germany, Spain, and South
Korea make plain, however, such a characterization of feed-in tariffs is only
half the story. The feed-in tariff's full arc does not stop with effective
renewable energy deployment. The complete story is that these laws have
numerous other effects, and those effects both impact the market more broadly
and risk undercutting the very benefits feed-in tariffs seek to provide.
Highlighting the nuanced ways in which this can occur is crucial. If
jurisdictions are to use feed-in tariffs to promote renewables, they should do so
with full vision. Feed-in tariffs offer much that deserves praise, but a complete
accounting of their costs and benefits is more complex than is often sold.
Jurisdictions considering using feed-in tariffs-and those that already doshould be aware that as these policies and the markets around them mature,
they also require more management and planning. All too easily, feed-in tariffs
in operation can become feed-in tariffs in turmoil. That turmoil demands
attention.
That feed-in tariffs create tumult over time should not be especially
revelatory, despite the relative inattention given to this point in the literature to
date.397 Feed-in tariffs by their very definition seek to disrupt the existing
energy system. Renewables are fundamentally different from conventional
generation, and as grid operators adjust to increasing amounts of these
resources in the system, both the physical infrastructure and how it is managed
must also evolve. To the extent FITs encourage very small or distributed
generation, this also changes the energy world. It holds the potential to reduce
the position of large incumbent firms and make energ production and
consumption more interactive, diversified, and populist. 3 As one German
document promoting the EEG brags, "Everyone can produce electricity." 39
Indeed, the paradox inherent in feed-in tariffs is that they are designed
to gradually self-destruct. A core objective of any renewable energy support
mechanism is to drive down production costs until renewables are on a level

39
For one notable exception, consider Professor Mormann's astute analysis of the challenges
facing FIT design. See Mormann, supra note 5, at 728-33.
3
See BMU, EEG, supra note 143, at 13, 14.
*

Id. at 13.
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playing field with conventional resources.40 0 Once that happens, the theory
goes, the support mechanism is no longer needed. Policy change, then,
demanded by feed-in tariffs can be seen as a sign of their success: They must
evolve because they are achieving desired results.
The problem, however, is twofold. First, adjusting to changing market
prices-much less deciding when a technology has achieved "grid parity"-is
no easy task, as the experiences that Germany, Spain, and South Korea had
with attempting to adjust their FIT rates in response to falling solar costs should
make abundantly clear.4 0' Second, political resistance to ending feed-in tariffs
is inevitable, even if that is their design. Industry always resists changing laws
that support it, and a likely consequence of effective feed-in tariffs is that by
becoming a bigger part of the system, the renewables industry may gain more
political suasion. Certainly this has happened under the German and Spanish
FITs.402
Nevertheless, while the lessons of feed-in tariffs in turmoil might be
evident, they remain relatively underappreciated. It is thus our objective here to
offer initial observations of the challenges that feed-in tariffs can face and
create, based on the case studies of Germany, Spain, and South Korea. Our
analysis is not intended to be definitive or exhaustive. The experiences of
Germany, Spain, and South Korea cannot necessarily be generalized. Every
country, every FIT is different, and the distinctive culture, politics, energy
makeup, and policy preferences of any given jurisdiction matter.
Our fundamental observation is plain: More attention needs to be given
to assessing how and when feed-in tariffs should evolve over time. Our
conclusions here represent an initial, if modest, contribution to that
conversation. The point is that the experience of feed-in tariffs is more nuanced
than either supporters or detractors of these policies often acknowledge.
On this score, a number of key points emerge. First, feed-in tariffs can
be extremely effective. Second, as feed-in tariffs begin functioning, they can
lead to problems that demand modifying policy design. Third, FIT operation
also can lead to unforeseen impacts external to the tariff itself. Most concretely,
these relate to grid integration and infrastructure growth, but perhaps most
importantly, these impacts underscore the need for lasting political support for
FIT regimes. Finally, feed-in tariffs inevitably must change over time.
Managing that change is a critical endeavor for policymakers. Markets change;
policies must too. Jurisdictions that quickly and adeptly adjust their feed-in
tariffs to the evolving markets these policies foment can maximize their laws'
efficacy and efficiency. Those who fail to adapt risk regulatory collapse. The
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See, e.g., Davies, supranote 14, at 48.

See MARKET STUDY, supra note 342, at 10; Couture, supra note 252.
Parnell, supra note 302. Of course, this also does not necessarily alleviate political
opposition to FITs when the regimes become expensive or flawed.
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challenge, then, is to keep FITs flexible enough that they are responsive to
changing markets without destabilizing the tariff regime itself. The
consequence of failing to find this balance is clear: an imploding policy
scheme, as in Spain, or replacement of the FIT with another policy altogether,
as in South Korea. We explore each of these observations in greater depth
below.
A.

FIT Effectiveness

The common narrative of feed-in tariffs is that they are effective, and
the experiences of Germany, Spain, and South Korea confirm this message.
Thus, the fact that managing FIT operation is more difficult and complex than
often implied is hardly reason for jurisdictions weighing how to promote
renewables to cross feed-in tariffs off their list of possible policies. Even in the
face of their challenges, feed-in tariffs remain a viable-and, arguably, often
preferable-option for renewable energy support.
Each of the experiences in the countries examined here bears this out.
In Germany, renewables penetration increased under both the StrEG and the
EEG, and especially under the latter. Sevenfold increases over just two decades
in the amount and percentage of electricity produced from renewables is
remarkable, to say the least.40 Indeed, Germany's shift from the StrEG to the
EEG itself offers a lesson for policymakers, as it appears that the EEG's focus
on technology costs, guarantee of two-decade-long payments, and spreading of
costs nationwide across consumers all significantly improved the EEG's
performance over its predecessor's. 4 04 Likewise in Spain, renewable energy
grew significantly: from barely 1% of total electricity production in 1990, to
over 50% in 2013 .405 The evolution of the Spanish FIT further demonstrates
that providing investor certainty through required grid connections and
mandatory purchases can be balanced with necessary flexibility in long-term
feed-in tariff design. South Korea's FIT was somewhat less effective at altering
the nation's energy profile. Nonetheless, electricity generated from renewables
increased by approximately 0.75% in less than a decade under the FIT, and
individual technologies grew exponentially.40 6 South Korea's experience with
PV, like that in Germany and Spain, also confirms the revelation that generous
rates for a particular technology often directly correlate with technology
growth.
The tale of feed-in tariffs in Germany, Spain, and South Korea, then, is
not just a cautionary one. It is also an optimistic one-a narrative highlighting
403
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404
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that even in jurisdictions that eventually give up on the idea of a feed-in tariff,
this policy can be successful at achieving its core objective. It is the question of
how to manage these laws as they move toward accomplishing their aims, then,
that demands increasing attention.
B.

InternalFIT Design

Possible problems with feed-in tariffs long have been known. From
their inception, FITs have been criticized as potentially too expensive, too
likely to lock-in technologies, too thwarting of competition, and too risky to
offer windfall profits to renewables producers.4 07 The response to these
concerns has consistently been, on the one hand, that FITs are nevertheless
more effective, less expensive, and more market-responsive than other
renewable energy support mechanisms, such as RPSs, and, on the other, that
adjustments to policy design can correct most FIT flaws.408
The experiences in Germany, Spain, and South Korea demonstrate that
the possible flaws identified in feed-in tariffs are not just theoretical but real.
Each of these countries faced dilemmas in implementing their laws that
eventually demanded policy design correction. Foremost among these is cost.
Indeed, if the experiences of Germany, Spain, and South Korea have anything
to teach other jurisdictions about FIT design, it may be that managing cost is
the most critical aspect of maintaining support for these policies. Certainly it is
cost-or at least its appearance through the Umlage-that is now driving the
debate over FIT reform in Germany.409 Likewise, it was perceived costs in the
form of a tariff deficit that caused Spain to pull back from its FIT, just as it was
the FIT's heavy financial draw on government coffers that was behind South
Korea's abandonment of its law.4 10
Of course, other design problems have repeatedly emerged in FIT
implementation, as the experiences of these countries show. Equity is one.
Thus, in Germany, many large industrial energy users have been effectively

40
See, e.g., TOBY D. COUTURE ET AL., supra note 111, at 72-73; Jonathan A. Lesser &
Xuejuan Su, Design of an Economically Efficient Feed-In Tariff Structurefor Renewable Energy
available
at
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981
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Development,
36
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421507004983.
408
See, e.g., Toby Couture & Yves Gagnon, An Analysis of Feed-In Tariff Remuneration
Models: Implicationsfor Renewable Energy Investment, 38 ENERGY POL'Y 955 (2010), available
at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509007940; Pablo del Rio, The
Dynamic Efficiency of Feed-In Tariffs: The Impact of Different Design Elements, 41 ENERGY
at
(2012),
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exempted from the EEG surcharge while everyday consumers bear the brunt of
the law's cost. 4 11
Likewise, figuring out how to transition renewables to the market has
been no easy task, despite the clear FIT objective of eventually making
renewable generators players in a fully competitive market. Each of the
countries highlighted here have experimented with resolving this tension. In
Germany, the original option to allow EEG-eligible producers to bid into the
market has been replaced with a stronger incentive to encourage them to do
so, 4 12 and now a proposal to force installations to use market-tethered tariffs is
a center feature in proposed EEG reform. Spain underwent a similar process, as
regulators first attempted to lure generators with a market premium, only to
later compel its use.4 South Korea, too, offered a fixed FIT typically below
market levels but a variable tariff rate above wholesale costs. 4 14
Indeed, even as more advanced FIT design options-including
degression, market-responsive degression, eligibility caps, and resource and
location banding and differentiation-have become available to help limit
program costs, the problem of possible windfall profits has remained. This can
be seen most visibly in the context of PV, though it also has reared its head in
wind. Without question, the dilemma of how to manage FIT prices as
technology costs drop has proven a knotty puzzle for policymakers in
Germany, Spain, and South Korea. In Germany, the government ended up
repeatedly revising the FIT in every year from 2009 to 2012 to try to both
reduce the speed of solar uptake and to bring FIT payments closer to
technology costs. Instead, PV installations did anything but abate, breaking
records in every one of these years.4 15 Now, FIT payments for solar in Germany
are made under a "breathing cap," or atmender Deckel, that means the tariff
fluctuates on a monthly basis depending on prior installations.4 16 Likewise,
Spain created and superseded royal decrees on a near-yearly basis to address
unintended consequences of prior FIT policy, technological development, and
political and economic shifts, all of which influenced actual costs, installations,
windfall profits, and government willingness to incur debt.417 Similarly, even
during the short time it was in place, South Korea adjusted its FIT policy,
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implementing program caps and reducing tariff rates to deal with falling PV
costs and ensuing installation booms.4 18
Fundamentally, however, all of the design problems the FIT regimes in
Germany, Spain, and South Korea have faced are merely evidence of a larger,
arguably more important, truth. No matter how well designed a feed-in tariff is,
it inevitably will need to undergo revision to remain effective and efficient.
Feed-in tariffs, then, do not just hold the potential for creating energy market
turmoil, they also are certain to embody turmoil within themselves.
C.

External Effects

It is not simply desire for good policy that prompts frequent tinkering
with feed-in tariffs, but also external market influences-changes that FITs
themselves provoke. These impacts on the broader energy system around feedin tariffs thus deserve careful attention.
Perhaps the most direct external effect of FITs is the need these laws
create for grid upgrades and infrastructure expansion. Such needs hardly are
unexpected, particularly where FITs are effective at incenting significant
renewable installations, but they also are not immaterial. In Germany, for
instance, investments of over a billion Euros already have been made to grapple
with the shift in the energy system affected by the EEG, with tens of billions of
Euros more to come. 4 19 Tension in Spain over guaranteeing grid-access to
renewables, yet forcing companies to pay for costly connection lines, likewise
demonstrates the systemic shifts in infrastructure that successful introduction of
renewables can initiate.420
A similar FIT impact is on the energy market itself. FITs by definition
seek to create a "breakthrough for renewable energy,"A21 and the way they do
this is by trying to alter-fundamentally-the extant energy market. They often
succeed. For instance, in Germany, renewable energy penetration has become
so pervasive that large amounts of flexible (load-following) generation is
needed, but many of the plants capable of providing this service do not want to
run because it is not profitable to do so. Thus, calls for new generation capacity
markets have become more frequent. At the same time, high PV tariffs have
encouraged so many workaday citizens to become involved in the energy
system that popular support for the EEG has a much more pervasive hold than
it ever did before. Indeed, at least some German utilities, who initially resisted
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the idea of a FIT, now actively participate in the renewables sector, with one
major utility having affirmatively backed in the EEG amendments in 2004.
Together, these external effects combine to create a kind of feedback
loop. FITs alter markets; those altered markets force FIT adjustments; the
adjusted tariffs transform markets further; and the cycle perpetuates. Thus, as
feed-in tariffs change the energy system around them, they themselves also
must be continually recalibrated to the new world they have created. Germany,
Spain, and South Korea each provide examples of this. The German EEG has
been amended no less than six times in twelve years, with another overhaul
coming soon. So too in Spain, where repeated amendments of the regime have
placed the law on the precipice of becoming something fundamentally different
than a traditional FIT. Likewise, South Korea's FIT, short-lived as it was,
repeatedly was adjusted and, eventually, abandoned.
All this underlines the transitional nature of feed-in tariffs. No doubt,
every change to a feed-in tariff is moderated by the complex machinery of
politics, which, by definition, vary by jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the core point
remains. FIT change begets more change, and at some point, the turmoil feedin tariffs create around them puts feed-in tariffs in turmoil themselves.
D.

Flexibility and Stability

Change itself is not a bad thing. Law's very nature is that we expect it
to shift to more closely match society's ever-evolving structures, expectations,
and norms. But in a regulated environment, where businesses need firm ground
on which to make plans, too much-or too rapid-change can be problematic.
This is especially true when a policy mechanism is chosen precisely because of
its ability to provide stability and certainty.
Change, in the context of feed-in tariffs, thus can create numerous
difficulties. Feed-in tariffs are lauded precisely because they provide certainty
that other renewable support mechanisms do not.422 Indeed, in many ways, a
feed-in tariff is akin to a fixed-rate, government-backed investment account.
Certainly this was true in Germany, Spain, and South Korea: Those FIT
regimes offered guaranteed payments for renewable energy production for
twenty years in Germany, twenty five in Spain, and up to twenty years in South
Korea.
The quandary, then, is that feed-in tariffs necessarily come in a
damned-if-you-do-damned-if-you-don't box. Feed-in tariffs inevitably have to
evolve because they alter the markets and systems in which they operate. If
they do not evolve, they risk becoming ineffective, overly expensive, or
unwanted. This is exactly why the German, Spanish, and Korean FITs have
been amended so heavily-to stay relevant. By the same token, however, the
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more feed-in tariffs change, the more they risk undermining their principal
asset: their ability to create market certainty. Thus, at a minimum, policymakers
must be careful as they seek to balance the need to change FITs with the speed,
frequency, and severity in which they do so. This is no easy task.
Indeed, how to strike the right balance between ensuring feed-in tariff
flexibility and market stability may be the most difficult dilemma in all FIT
design. It is the core tension in the policy's function: Governments that succeed
at it may well prosper in their renewable energy policy. Those who do not will
likely founder. We do not endeavor here to seriously explore approaches for
resolving this tension, but a few initial observations may help demarcate its
contours.
First, FIT change generally-if not universally-must be prospective.
This is why even though Germany has repeatedly changed the EEG, it has
almost always done so on a forward-looking rather than retroactive basis, and it
is why Spanish amendments with retroactive effect have ignited such
controversy. Retroactive changes to feed-in tariffs do not just render the
policies less stable. They dislocate investor expectations.
Second, careful policy design can help minimize the amount of change
needed in feed-in tariffs. For instance, choosing a funding mechanism that
spreads the cost of a FIT as widely as possible is likely to make the policy more
durable. This was precisely the problem in South Korea, where the government
paid for the FIT out of the state budget instead of tying its costs to electricity
prices. It also explains why the discourse over the German Umlage has become
so sharp; the exemption of large manufacturers from EEG costs makes
everyone else feel the pain more keenly. Indeed, knowing that modern
economies tend to be cyclical, it would seem imperative that feed-in tariffs not
have all their funding eggs in one financial basket. Of course, disentangling
how much of FITs' recent difficulties can be attributed to poor design rather
than the global recession is no easy task. But recognizing that there are some
ways to limit how government austerity might impact policies as important as
feed-in tariffs should be obvious enough.
Third, it may be that some technologies are more susceptible to policy
change than others. Intuitively, it would seem that this relationship may hinge
heavily on technological maturity and production costs. As happened in
Germany, Spain, and South Korea, the tariffs for PV necessarily became more
flexible-and thus less certain-over time. Yet the PV market was able to
handle this change because the technology's cost was falling so rapidly: that is,
because the technology was maturing. Likewise for wind, Germany was able to
lower FIT payments early on and still achieve success because increasing wind
deployments gave the technology a stronger market position as its own costs
decreased. Thus, it may be that as technologies mature, the amount of certainty
provided by the feed-in tariff can also decrease, just as the amount of support
should as well.
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In the end, there can be no doubt that the amount of change a FIT
undergoes is neither as flashy nor as likely to capture the public's attention as
easily as its costs might. It is also self-evident that maintaining public support
for feed-in tariffs is essential if they are to remain stable. But attention to other
aspects of the FIT should not diminish the need to pay careful heed to deciding
when, and how much, any given policy should change. That, at least, is one
clear lesson the turmoil of the feed-in tariffs in Germany, Spain, and South
Korea has to teach.
VI. CONCLUSION

The paradox of feed-in tariffs is that by providing certainty, they force
themselves to change. It is this fact-and the reality that governments must
grapple with how to adjust their policies over time-that complicates the feedin tariff narrative beyond the simple, common accounting of these laws as
effective, efficient renewable energy support mechanisms. Feed-in tariffs
clearly can bear those attributes. But making FITs resilient requires much more
than putting an initially well-designed policy in place. As the experiences of
Germany, Spain, and South Korea show, careful, continued policy calibration
and innovation is necessary to keep feed-in tariffs durable. This more nuanced
narrative of feed-in tariffs only recently has begun to garner attention, and it is
one that cannot be ignored. At their core, feed-in tariffs aim to transform
energy markets: to scale up renewables, increase their prevalence, drive down
their costs, and alter the shape and makeup of electricity generation. That feedin tariffs actually succeed in this endeavor should not be surprising, but neither
should it be that feed-in tariffs must evolve in response to their success. As
proponents of renewable energy look to the future, this may be their core
dilemma: to envision how feed-in tariffs should change over time, and then to
help investors plan for the policy's evolution. In the meantime, the fundamental
challenge is adapting feed-in tariffs to the turmoil around them. Governments
who excel at this may keep their policies aloft, functional, and effective, while
those who do not are likely to find themselves on a much different trajectory.
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